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ABSTRACT
Voice over Internet Protocol technology (VoIP) is progressing commendably, but packet
loss, propagation delay, jitter, unreliable IP networks, and vulnerability to attacks by
Internet hackers are among critical issues that have been identified. Voice privacy and
security needs to focused upon and data encryption techniques are the answers in
providing the security needed. However, traditional cryptosystems demand high
computational complexity andhigh digital signal processors which in return increases the
cost of implementation.
There is parallel growth incryptographic techniques which originated an intense research
activity and the search for new directions in cryptography such as chaotic encryption.
Due to its deterministic nature and its sensitivity to initial conditions, chaos has a certain
potential in creating a newway of securing information to be transmitted or stored.
There are two main objectives to this project. First is study the feasibility of the chaotic
encryption scheme in providing a solution in to preserve data security while maintaining
the voice quality for voice over Internet Protocol. Secondly, a new scheme based on a
chaos system will be implemented for voice data. In order to achieve the second
objective, a study had been carried out on other proposed schemes mainly the
Hierarchical Data Security Protection (HDSP) for VoIP. This scheme performs two main
operations which is the data-frame interleaving and intra-frame data encryption using bit
swapping. Based onthe HDSP scheme, the author suggests a new scheme using two level
encryption techniques, based on chaos. In this scheme, the author uses the bit swapping
technique as the second encryption-decryption level and enhances it with a first level
encryption-decryption scheme using the two's compliment overflow nonlinearity
encoder-decoder pair.
The implementation ofthis scheme is specified to do real time processing ofvoice data. It
can also be used to read, encrypt and write awave file. The entire system is implemented,
tested and validated using MATLAB and Visual C++.
Due to the promising prospect ofchaotic encryption in the field ofcryptography, and the
lack of implementation ofthis new encryption-decryption algorithm, this project focuses





1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY
The modern telecommunications networks, the Internet and mobile telephones have
expanded the possibilities of user communications and information transmission to
certain limits which were unimaginable not a very long time ago. With the great demand
indigital signal transmission and the big losses from illegal data access, data security has
become a critical and imperative issue. The increasing development of the broadband
networks and services, alongside recent demand for privacy and paid services, has led to
need for systems and algorithms to encrypt information [4]. Some of the important
applications include encryption of video messages, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP),
and data messages transmitted over telematic networks i.e. electronic banking and e-
commerce.
Voice over Internet protocol network application meets the challenges of combining
voice networks with packet networks by allowing both voice and signaling information to
be transported over the packet network. In short, it means to transmit voice over the
Internet. VoIP technology is progressing admirably, but certain drawbacks have been
indicated such as packet loss, propagation delay, jitter, unreliable IP networks, and
vulnerability to attacks by Internet hackers. Thus, it is essential to perform data
encryption onvoice transmitted over the Internet while preserving the quality of the voice
from packet loss. There are researches on voice encryption using scrambling techniques,
some of which uses discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to perform voice encryption and
decryption inthe frequency domain [1]. Although the performance has been good, but the
computational power is large because of the forward and inverse transformations. It also
increases cost as it requires a high performance digital processor to realize the
transformations in real-time voice applications.
Encryption1 technology is the practice of obscuring the privacy and security of the
information by changing readable text to gibberish. The science of encryption itself is
called cryptography. The significance of cryptography is evident as a method to secure
communication and data authentication that offers confidentiality, data integrity, data and
entity authentication. Encryption techniques are being rapidly developed, standardized
and adopted such as RSA, DES, AES and etc. With the advancement in digital
communication technology, the importance of cryptography in ensuring security and
privacy for critical data transmission has been further increased with the need for secure
communication and data authentication method. With the Internet, taking over as the
preferred medium of communication, the demand for data encryption techniques to
provide message security and authenticationhas been steadily increasing.
Hence, there is a parallel growing demand of cryptographic techniques which originated
an intense research activity and the search of new directions in cryptography. As a result
a rich variety of cryptosystems for end to end communications have been put forward,
where robustness and privacy are equally diverse.
Chaos has attracted much attention in the field of cryptography for private and secure
communications due to its deterministic nature and its sensitivity to initial values. Such
properties mean that chaos has certain potential in creating a new way of securing
information to be transmitted or stored. Methods based on chaos theory provide high
level of security and are competitive to traditional encryption techniques because they are
inexpensive to implement [4] and posses low computational complexity. Chaos and
cryptography have common features, the most prominent being sensitive to variables and
parameter changes. Shannon in his paper [C&C] wrote; "In a good mixing
transformation...functions are complicated, involving all variables in a sensitive way. A
small variation of any one variable changes the output considerably." Chaos is the
complex behavior of a simple system and it is very difficult to reproduce or decode,
which makes it an effective means to secure communications.
The process ofchanging the original data to gibberish or cipher text
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Many efforts have been put into developing chaos-based cryptographic systems in recent
years as emerging chaotic systems promised a new direction for innovation in
cryptography since the development of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Many
ofthese works are published, which shows agreat deal ofimprovement and advancement
over the years.
One of such work is the Hierarchical Data Security Protection scheme. This technique
has been proposed in [1] as solution to the drawbacks VoIP has encountered. This
scheme maintains both the voice quality which is degraded from the packet loss and
provides high data security for the voice being transmitted. This scheme proposes two
methods of data security i.e. inter-frame data interleaving and intra-frame data
encryption. These operations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This scheme as
been used as the base ofthe author's research. Based on this work, another scheme has
been implemented
The chaos based cryptosystem is new and has all the profound qualities for research.
There are crucial similarities between cryptography and chaos. The equivalent of rounds,
keys and diffusion in cryptographic algorithms in chaotic systems are iterations,
parameters and initial change sensitivity, respectively. Using chaos in data encryption
possesses features of low computational complexity, high security and no distortion.
Compared to traditional encryption techniques, chaotic systems are competitive because
they are inexpensive and easy to implement [5],
Afoundation has thus been set to study the feasibility and applicability of an encryption-
decryption scheme for voice data based on chaos systems. It is necessary to study the
feasibility and applicability of the chaos encryption scheme with emphasis on the strength
ofthe cipher. The strength of the system should be compared to current cryptosystems
standards. The secrecy level should at least be equal ifnot greater than these standards.
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The introduction of chaotic systems into cryptography marks avery interesting area for
research into innovating novel encryption schemes. In 1998, Baptista proposed Chaotic
Encryption method which is said to be better than the traditional methods present today
due to its randomness, stochastic, and mixed-ergodic characteristic.
The drawbacks of the Voice over Internet Protocol need to be addressed so that it can
emerge from a specialized application to mainstream voice communications. The main
drawbacks indicated are voice quality degradation due to packet loss and vulnerability to
attacks by hackers. The current schemes used to do real-time encryption require high
computational power and high performance digital signal processors which increase the
cost [1]. Hence, the author is carrying out a research to find new schemes which can
preserve high data security. Since chaos is a new direction in the field ofcryptography
with promising results such as low computational complexity, high security and no
distortion, this project proposes an implementation of a new scheme based on chaos
which can overcome the drawbacks ofthe Voice over Internet Protocol focusing on data
security.
1.4 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
i. To study and develop a new security system based on the HDSP scheme. The
HDSP scheme consist data interleaving for voice quality maintenance and intra-
frame data security based on pixel permutation using chaotic bit strings for VOIP
network.
ii. To study and propose a method on how chaotic encryption can be used to secure
voice communications over a VoIP network.
iii. To research, study and propose a chaotic encryption algorithm using other chaotic
maps i.e. logistic map
iv. Convert the chaotic encryption scheme based on two's compliment overflow
nonlinearity encoder-decoder developed in Simulink to C.
v. To enhance the chaotic encryption scheme in (ii) by proposing an additional level
of encryption using permutation techniques in C.
vi. To encrypt voice data sent in real-time.
The development of the proposed symmetric chaotic encryption scheme will be
developed using MATLAB, Simulink and C. The end system will be a standalone C
application which can run in terminal connected to a network. The scope of study will
focused on data encryption techniques applicable to VoIP and will not cover techniques
to reduce packet loss or maintain voice quality in a VoIP system.
1.5 THESIS ORGANIZATION
The chapters are organized to provide a flow to the report and also to aid the reader in
understanding the project in a more systematic and ordered manner.
Chapter 1 highlights the overview or background on the project and literature review to
justify the basis of the project followed by the problem statement. The objectives and
scope of work are also outlinedin this chapter.
Chapter 2 discusses the theories involved in the project and provides a base for the reader
to understand the operations and implementations involved in this project. This chapter
helps the reader obtain supporting information and the theories used inthis project.
Chapter 3 then discusses the methodology of implementation and algorithms used in
realizing the final product.
Chapter 4 further elaborates the results and observations obtained and makes a
comparison to the theories reviewed in Chapter 2. All findings and discussions are
highlighted here.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the project report by cross-checking the relevancy to the
objectives, suggested future work and recommendations.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY
2.1 DATA SECURITY IN NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT
In the recent years, there has been a tremendous upsurge in information and data
transfers over the telephone and computer networks. Connectivity has become a buzz
word in industries and the increasing sophistication of network software and controllers
is allowing the average computer users' access to information never thought possible a
decade ago. This information ranges from very simple electronic mail to highly
complex medical imaging.
In any of these data transfers, the security of the information being transferred is a
pressing concern. However with this increase to global databases, the need to
secure/protect information from browsers, whether during transmission, reception, and
storage risen dramatically. The increasing development of broadband networks and
services, alongside the recent demand privacy, has led to the need for systems and
algorithms to encrypt information. The most vital applications include the encryption of
video messages, voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and data messages transmitted over
telematic networks i.e. electronic banking and commerce. Currently the solution to the
security concern is to use expensive and inefficient private networks and leased lines.
Widely used encryption and keying schemes based upon Data Encryption Standard
(DES), a secret key cryptography, and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) a public key
cryptography. Initial investigations [19] show that a HYBRID cryptographic approach
where public key is used for authentication or key management and the symmetric key
approach for encryption would be most appropriate for This project discusses the latter,
symmetric key encryption based on a chaos system for security that will allow voice
data to be transmitted over the IP network so that only the intended receiver can
decipher.
2.2 VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL (VoIP)
Voice over Internet protocol network application meets the challenges of combining
voice networks with packet networks by allowing both voice and signaling information
to be transported over the packet network. VoIP wants to provide the efficiency of a
packet switched network while rivaling the voice quality ofa circuit switching network.
VoIP technology is progressing admirably, but certain drawbacks have been indicated
such as intolerant of lengthy delays, out of order packets, packet loss, propagation
delay, jitter, unreliable IPnetworks, and vulnerability to attacks by Internet hackers. All
these problems gravely degrade the quality ofvoice transmitted to the recipient.
The overall technology requirements of an Internet Protocol (IP) solution can be split
into four categories: signaling, encoding, transport and gateway control. The purpose of
the signaling control is to create and manage connections between endpoints, as well as
the calls themselves. Next, when the conversation commences, the analog signal
produced by the human voice, needs to be encoded for transmission across an IP
network. The IP network itself must ensure that the real-time conversation is
transported across the available media in a manner that produces acceptable voice
quality.
It is essential to perform data encryption on voice transmitted over the Internet while
preserving the quality of the voice from packet loss. There are researches on voice
encryption using scrambling techniques, some of which uses discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) to perform voice encryption and decryption in the frequency domain [I].
Although the performance has been good, but the computational power is large because
of the forward and inverse transformations. It also increases cost as it requires a high
performance digital processor to realize the transformations in real-time voice
applications.
2.2.1 Voice Quality
Many factors determine the voice quality, including the choice of codec, packet loss,
echo control, delay, delay variation and the design of the network. Packet loss causes
voice clippings and skips. Some codec algorithms can correct for some lost voice
packets. Techniques such as interleaving and error correction using CRC can be used to
maintain the voice quality. The concept of data interleaving is used to scramble the
voice packets in different frames to avoid continuous voice corruption due to packet
loss.
TCP is the internet protocol that suites main transport layer protocol. It also provides
addressing (with service addresses) services at the network layer. TCP provides reliable
full-duplex, connection-oriented transport services to upper layer protocols. TCP works
in conjunction with IP to move packets through the internetworking. TCP assigns a
connection ID (port) to each virtual circuit. It also provides message fragmentation and
reassembly using sequence numbering. Error checking is enhanced through the use of
TCP acknowledgements.
UDP is a connectionless protocol that works at the transport layer. UDP also transports
datagram butdoes not acknowledge their receipt. UDP also uses port address to achieve
datagram delivery, but this port address is simply a pointer to a process, not a
connection identifier, as it is withTCP. Mainly, voicepacket transmission uses UDP.
To make VoIP successful in real time networking interactive applications, guaranteed
QOS or quality of service networks are inevitable for minimizing the delay caused by
the packet network transmission. It is reasonable to assume that the packet network
transmission delay of a guaranteed QOS is ~25ms [1].
The proposed system in this project however does not cover the framework of packet
loss and only focuses on data security.
2.3 ENCRYPTION-DECRYPTION
Inthis project we deal with the theory ofencryption and decryption, existing encryption
standards, and mainly chaotic dynamical systems and their use in solving practical
problems like implementing anefficient cryptographic system.
Encryption standards are evaluated for their suitability according to three main criteria:
• Security
• Cost
• Algorithm and implementation characteristics
"Security" of the proposed algorithm was absolutely essential and any algorithm found
not to be secured would not be considered further. "Cost" refers to the computational
efficiency i.e. speed and memory requirements of various types of implementations
including software, hardware and smart cards. "Algorithm and implementation"
characteristics include flexibility and algorithm simplicity among other factors.
From the author's understanding, on "what makes a good encryption algorithm", though
not complete, is outlined as below:
• Iterations requiredper sample
• Speed of encryption and decryptions
• Error propagation (when you iterate something, i.e. current output depends on
the previous output etc, they tend to produce errorpropagation)
Thus, these are the criteria to look into when comparing two encryption schemes.
A need to replace DES had arisen and the replacement was to be called AES or
Advanced Encryption Standard. Rijndael was selected to be the Advanced Encryption




AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can process data blocks of 128 bits,
using cipher keys with lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits. Rijndael was designed to
handle additional block sizes and key lengths; however they are not adopted in this
standard.
AES is a key-iterated block cipher; it consists of the repeated application of a round
transformation on the state. The number ofrounds denoted by Nr depends on the block
length and key length. Table 2.1 lists the value of Nr as a function of Nk and Nb. For
AES, Nb is fixed to a value of4. Nr=10 for key length 128 bits, Nr=12 for key length
192 bits and Nr=14 for key length 256 bits. For AES, the value of Nb is set to 4 since
the block length is 128 bits.
Table 2.1. Number ofrounds (Nr) as a function ofNb (Nb = block length/32) and Nk
(Nk = key length/32)
Nk
" Nb
4 5 6 7 8
4 10 11 12 13 14
5 11 11 12 13 14
6 12 12 12 13 14
7 13 13 13 13 14
8 14 14 14 14 14
The input and output ofAES is considered to be one-dimensional arrays of8-bit bytes
consisting of 128 bits (digits with values of 1or 0). These sequences will sometimes be
referred to as blocks and the number of bits they contain will be referred to as their
length. For encryption the input is a plaintext block and a key and the output is cipher
text block. For decryption, the input is a cipher text block and a key and the output is
the plaintext block. The key for the AES algorithm is a sequence of 128, 192 or 256
bits. Other input, output and key lengths are not permitted by this standard. The bits
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within such sequences will be numbered starting at zero and ending at one less than the
sequence length (block length orkey length). The number i attached to a bit is known as
its index and will be in one of the ranges 0 </ < 128, 0 <? < 192 or 0 </ < 256
depending on the block length and key length (specified above).
The round transformation is denoted by Round and is a sequence offour transformation
called steps. The structure of the AES round transformation requires that all steps be
invertible and consist ofsimple components rather than complex ones.
According to [21] and [22], a high-level description of the AES algorithm can be
summarized as below:
I. Given a plaintext, x, initialize State to be x and perform an operation
ADD-ROUNDKEY3, which x-ors the RoundKey with State.
II. For each ofthe first Nr-1 rounds, perform a substitution operation called
SubBytes on State using an S-Box; perform a permutation ShiftRows on
State; perform an operation MixColumns on State; and perform
AddRoundKey.
III. Perform SubBytes; perform ShiftRows; and perform AddRoundKey.
IV. Define the cipher texty to be the State.
These processes are required to perform an encryption operation in AES. To decrypt, it
is necessary to perform all operations in the reverse order, and use the key schedule in
the reverse order. Further, the operations ShiftRows, SubBytes, MixColumns, must be
replaced by their inverse operation including the operation AddRoundKey. It is also
possible to construct an equivalent inverse cipher which performs AES decryption by
doing a sequence of inverse operations in the same order as it is done for AES
encryption. It is suggested in [21] that this can lead to implementation efficiencies.
3Round keys are values derived from cipher key using the Key Expansion routine; they are applied to the
State in the cipher andinverse cipher
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2.3.2 Analysis of AES
The design criteria for AES were looked upon during this analysis on why the 4 steps
are performed as such in each round. The table 2.2 below summarizes the operations,





Design Criteria and importance
1. Non-linearity
a) Correlation. The maximum input-output correlation amplitude
must be as small as possible.
b) Difference propagation probability. The maximum difference
propagation probability must be as small as possible.
2. AlgebraicComplexity. Thealgebraic expression of the S-box4 in
GF (28) must be complex.
1.Dimensions. Thetransformation is bricklayer transformation
operating on4-byte columns.
2. Linearity. The transformation is linear over GF(2)
3. Diffusion. The transformation has tohave relevant diffusion power.
4. Performance on 8-bit processors. The performance of the







H- Non-linear substitution table used in several byte substitution transformations and in the Key Expansion
routine to perform a onefor-one substitution of a bytevalue.
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2.3.3 Cryptanalysis
The current state-of-the-art in cryptanalysis indicates that the resistance of iterative
block ciphers against cryptanalytic attacks increases with the number ofrounds.
According to [21] and [23] the AES is secure against all known attacks. This is one of
the main reasons AES is chosen to be compared against chaos encryption. Various
aspects of it design incorporate features that help provide security against specific
attacks. For example, the used of the finite field inversion operation in the construction
of the S-Box yields linear approximation and difference distribution tables in which
entries areclose to uniform. This is the main factor which helps provide security against
differential and linear attacks. As well, the linear transformation, MixColumns makes it
impossible tot find differential and linear attacks that involve 'few' active S-boxes.
There are apparently no known attacks on AES that are faster than exhaustive search.
The 'best' attacks on AES apply to variants of the cipher, which the number of rounds
is reduces and are not effective for 10-round AES.
2.4 CHAOS
In signal theory, chaos is classified as one of the non-periodic signal systems which are
characterized by a continuous noise-like broad power spectrum. Chaotic signals are
naturally broadband and are noise-like. Chaotic systems are characterized by sensitive
dependence on initial conditions where a small perturbation eventually causes a large
change in the state of the system itself. The practical long-term prediction of these
signals is not possible due to the high dependence on initial conditions. Chaotic systems
also decorrelate rapidly with themselves. The autocorrelation function of a chaotic
signal has a large peak at zero and decays rapidly. They also posses deterministic
structure that makes it possible to generate noise like chaotic signals in a theoretically
reproducible manner. Chaos based algorithms offers a high degree of randomness,
stochastic and mixed-ergodic properties.
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2.4.1 Chaos and Cryptography
Chaos describes a system that is sensitive to initial conditions, generates apparently
random behavior but at the same is completely deterministic. These properties have
much potential for any application in cryptography as it is hard to make long term
predictions on chaotic systems.
Firstly, chaotic functions are sensitive to initial conditions thus any slight change in the
initial value will yield a drastically different ciphertext. This indicates that the system
will be strong against any brute force attacks as the number of possible keys is
enormousgiven that the precisionof initial value is high.
Secondly, being deterministic means that the same mapping function and initial value
will yield the same set of values. Conventional random number generators cannot
regenerate random numbers where as chaos allows us to repeat the same string as long
as the same mapping functions and initial value is used. The apparent randomness of the
system makes attacks suchthe 'codebook' attackimpossible.
Claude Shannon had pointed out two properties which make a good cryptographic
system hinder statistical analysis. Diffusion means that changing a character of the
plaintext would affect several characters inciphertext and likewise changing a character
of ciphertext would affect several characters in the plaintext. Confusion is a technique
which corresponds to those parts of a cipher mechanism which change the association
between the input values and output values. This is generally accomplished by
substituting every fundamental block for another one according the rules dictated by the
algorithm. This technique confuses the output by modifying the data itself.
Analyzing an example of a cipher using chaos, given a set of plaintext which is to be
encrypted in integer form, a mapping function must be defined i.e. logistic map. Next, is
to define the initial value, n, of the mapping function. Thus, the first character in the
ciphertext will use n as the initial value and first number in the plaintext as the number
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of iterations to yield the ciphertext character. The next ciphertext character will be
obtained using the previous ciphertext character as the initial value, while iterating the
number of times indicated by the present plaintext character. Hence, any change in
plaintext would affect the remaining part of the ciphertext. This means that diffusion is
introduced in the system. Secondly, the characters in the ciphertext will not only depend
on the key but the plaintext itself. Thus there are elements of confusion as well in the
system. As long as the mapping function is not disclosed, the system can withstand
statistical attacks.
2.4.2 Chaotic Encryption and its Algorithm
Chaotic map is a chaotic system with the property to evolve identically if the initial
conditions are the same. The chaotic map is the main part ofthe encryption system. The
more complex the map, the more difficult to force it. One way to enhance the
complexity ofthe maps for encryption is by mixing them. The real important part is to
be able to reproduce the maps the way it has been mixed. It will be more difficult now
to calculate all the possible situations.
The key is the only piece of information unknown to the attacker. The key could be
public knowledge and this fact should not compromise the system. One way ofsolving
it is by means ofchaotic dynamical system. There are several methods by which the
plaintext can be combined with a chaotic sequence to produce seemly cipher text, one
that appears random and disordered by permutation or invertible substitution. The digits
or the letters of the cipher text can be calculated from the original and the key as
follows:
ci = Ck (tk) =ti + k(mod m) (1)
where ci is the cipher text's i-th digit, // the i-th digit ofthe original text and kthe actual
value of the chaotic sequence, mis assumed to be the alphabet size. Decoding is simply
performed by the inverse operation of (1).
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ti= ci -k (modm) n\
This is possible for the recipient to decode because he knows the key and can
reconstruct the chaotic sequence appearing in(2). On the other hand, it will be difficult
for the hacker because he lacks the information of the original conditions of the system
that led to the production ofk. Thus, the sender, recipient and hacker are aware of the
chaotic system being used but only the sender and recipient share the knowledge of the
exact initial condition of the system. This constitutes the key. The hacker may try to
guess the conditions but his chance ofsuccess is inversely proportional to 2n where n is
the number ofeffective bits used to describe the initial conditions. Even if he is able to
come up with a close guess, it would not help because of the chaotic system's
sensitivity to initial conditions would multiply any original discrepancy in a few
iterations. It is possible to generate efficient ciphers using for example aquadratic map
exhibiting fully developed chaos. Variations on this theme are easy to come by, instead
of resorting to substitution scheme, one might use a chaotic system to generate a
permutation matrix and use this toencode a message.
The key advantages ofthe chaos encryption are resistance to traditional form ofattacks
because it is not written like standard algorithms, ease in increasing the variety of
algorithms, difficulty in detecting spectral peaks and suitability of implementation in
analogue systems [10]. It is a simple method of encryption and can be achieved by
iteration with ahigh level of security. There is no short cut and the security depends on
the key.
But as with every system, there is always a flip side, and chaos cryptography is no
exception. Due to difficulty in cryptanalysis the security cannot be readily quantified
[10]. The system is also said to be insecure to be encrypting long messages. This
weakness is attributed to the fact that chaos mappings can go in an orbit or repeat its
pattern for various initial conditions. It is also slow in speed and requires a high
precision offloating point calculation and large number ofiteration.
17
2.4.3 Chaoticencryption using logistic map
The logistic map is given by the equation:
x(n+l)=r*x(n) *(l-x(n)) (3)
where the value of the bifurcation parameter, r should be selected as the values that can
result in chaos and 0<x (0) < 1. The successive states from the logistic map is derived
using equation in (3) and the preceding 16 or 24 bits below the decimal point of the
binary representation of x(n) where n= 1,2, ... areextracted to constitute the chaotic bit
string sequence b(0), b(l), b(2), In the chaotic systems [1], there are perfect
statistical characteristics such as (i) sensitive dependence on initial condition and (ii)
there exist trajectories that are dense, bounded but neither periodic nor quasi-periodic in
the state space. Since the one dimensional logistic map has the property of easy
realization, it is adopted to generate the unpredictable sequence b(.).The logistic
equation is as the equation in (1) and is parabolic like the quadratic mapping with f (0)
= f (1) = 0. The value of u is selected from a range of values which can cause chaos
based on the bifurcation diagram and 0 <x (0) <1. The value ofx (n) is the nth value in
the sequence and then folds it back by (1 -x (n)). The author carried outresearch onhow
to determine the value ofu such that it would create chaos. According to [5] and [14],
the parameter u varies in the interval [0, 4] so that u will be values that can generate
chaos and x (0) will stay in the range of 0 to 1. This can be observed from the





The bifurcation parameter takes the range 0<u<4 and determines the chaotic attractor.
In the range 0<u<l, x tends to zero while Ku<4 leads to a point attractor. At u«3 the
first bifurcation occurs, the curve bifurcates again at u«3.45 and the period doubling
continues at ever closer u values to chaos. At u=4, complex chaotic behavior can be
observed.























Figure 2.2 Blockdiagram ofproposedHDSPscheme appliedin VoIP
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This technique has been proposed in [1] as solution to the drawbacks VoIP has
encountered. This scheme maintains both the voice quality which is degraded from the
packet loss and provides high data security for the voice being transmitted. This scheme
proposes two methods of data security i.e. inter-frame data interleaving and intra-frame
data encryption. These operations are controlled by chaotic bit-string generated from the
chaotic bit-string generator based on the 1-D logistic map. The inter-frame data
interleaving, permutation is adopted to perform frame re-ordering. Pixel value
transformation including bit swapping and XOR or XNOR operations are adapted to
translated the original pixel value to an encrypted one. This encryption algorithm falls
in the combination form which performs both position permutation and value
transformation. The value transformation has low computational complexity and low
hardware cost. This combination normally exhibits the potential ofhigh security. The
block diagram in Figure 2.2 below illustrates the proposed HDSP scheme to be applied
in VoIP. The main focus is the framing operation, inter-frame data interleaving and
intra-frame data encryption. The framing operation would include breaking up the voice
input to a defined number of packets. The chaotic bit string generator is based on the
chaotic system utilized (chaotic maps). To generate the binary sequence b(0), b(l),
b{2\... from x(0), x(l), x(2\..., the 8 bits before the decimal 16 point of the binary
representation ofx(n) for n =0, 1, 2,... are extracted toconstitute the sequence. That is,
0.b(16n+0)b(16n+l) b(16n+14)b{16n+15) (4)
is the binary representation ofx(n) for n = 0, 1,2, n.
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Fig. 2.3Block diagram ofproposed security schemefor VoIP
Based on the scheme in Figure 2.2, a new security scheme for VoIP as depicted by the
block diagram above in Figure 2.3. The proposed level one encryption which is two's
compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder-decoder and level two encryption which is
the bit swapping are inserted in the traditional VoIP data flow between the speech
CODEC and the channel CODEC. These operations are controlled by a chaotic bit
string generator based on the chaotic system of a one-dimensional logistic map. The
implementation ofthe encryption-decryption schemes will be discussed inChapter 3 of
Methodology and Project Work while the system will be formally discussed in Chapter
4 of Results and Discussion.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY and PROJECT WORK
3.1 Procedures and Methodology
The project work is divided into two parts of to ensure that the time frame of two
semesters is fully utilized and organized well. For the first semester, the objectived
outlined was to get acquainted with the theory ofcryptography, focusing specifically on
the Advanced Encryption Standard and Chaos Encryption and comparing results ofboth
encryption schemes.
The objectives of the second semester has been clearly outlined in Chapter 1. Firsly, a
thorough and intense research is carried out to gather suffiecient information andresearch
papers pertaining chaos, chaos in cryptography, streaming, voice over Internet Protocol
and its security issues. The research is done based on books, IEEE publications, the
Internet, and also certain individuals inclined to this area of research. The information
being gathered is important in understanding the role ofchaos in cryptology, the concept
ofstreaming to be applied in a cryptosystem to provide real-time encryption, the security
issues in voice over Internet Protocol andencryption schemes to overcome it.
Secondly, the focus is to finalize onthe chaotic encryption scheme implementation based
on research carried out. Materials relevant to voice over Internet Protocol and its security
issues have been researched upon and the author has decided to further explore the
scheme proposed in [HDSP]. This scheme is discussed in Chapter 2 and is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. The author will focus on implementing the framing block, and intra-frame






















Figure 3.1 Operations ofinter-frame data interleaving and intra-frame data encryption







Figure 3.2 The chaotic bitstringgenerator
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In the proposed HDSP scheme there are three main operations i.e. framing, inter-frame
data interleaving and intra-frame data encryption as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The
operating intra-frame data encryption is controlled by the chaotic bit string generated
from the chaotic bit string generator based on a one-dimensional logistic map as
illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Determine the bifurcation parameter, randinitial point x(0) ofthe 1-D logistic mapfr(x)
= rx(l-x) where r should be selectedfrom a range of values which would result in chaos
and 0 < x(0) <1. Evolve each successive state from the map by x(n+l)=rx(n)(l-x(n)) and
the preceeding 16 bits below the decimalpoint ofthe binary representation ofx(n) where
n=l, 2, ... are extracted to constitute the chaotic bit-string sequence b(0), b(l), b(2) and
so on.
The chaotic bit string is generated by extracting 16 bits from each evolution state of the
1-D logistic map. This bit string is important as it ismanipulated in the swap bit function.
The successive states are evolved from the logistic map and the preceding 16 bits below
the decimal point for the binary representation of x(n) are extracted to constitute the
chaotic bit string sequence b(0), b(l), b(2), b(3) b(16). To generate the chaotic
binary sequence, the 16 bits before the decimal point ofthe binary representation ofx(n)
where n=0,l,2,..are extracted to constitute the sequence. For example for x (0), the 16 bit-
binary representation
O.b (16n+0)b (16n+l)b (16n+2) b (16n+7)
where ofn=0, which returns b (0), b (1) b (15). The chaotic bits would be passed to
an array with N number of elements which is equal to the number of iterations and used
in the bit swapping function.
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Figure 3.3 Intra-frame dataencryption
With reference to Figure 3.3, for intra frame encryption, the pixel value transformation
which includes two operations of bit swapping and XOR operations based on the chaotic
bit string b(0),b(l) b(n) which transforms the original pixel value to an encrypted one.
The algorithm for the bit swapping is discussed as follows. Each sample is represented by
one byte which is 8 bits. The swapping will take place locally within the sample. The
pairs to be swapped is predetermined as bit zero with bit 4 (0, 4), bit one and five (1, 5),
bit two and six (2, 6) and bit three and seven (3, 7). Each pair will be assigned to one
chaotic bit. If the bit is 1, then it will be swapped. If the bit is 0, the pair will remain.
Then, the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th bit will be XORed to the four chaotic bits. This data
encryption approach has the features of low computational complexity. The algorithm is
as below:
g' is the result of the data encryption Definition 2: The operation SwapBitw(dr,
ds) is defined as to swap bit dr and bit ds ifw is equal to 1 or to preserve their
original values ifw is equal to 0.
Step 1: Determine the bifurcation parameter, r and initial point x(0) of the 1-D
logistic map fr(x) = rx(l-x) where r should be selectedfrom a range of values
which would result in chaos and 0 < x(0) <I. Evolve each successive state from
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the map by using equation (3) and the preceeding 16bits below the decimalpoint
of the binary representation ofx(n) where n=I, 2, ... are extracted to constitute
the chaotic bit-string sequence b(0), b(l), b(2) andso on.




For oddjsit = 1 to 7 Step2
doddjif = doddbu'XOR b(4xctr + odd_bit)
End
End
Step3; The encryption result g' is obtained andthe algorithm terminated. "
The interframe data interleaving will be replaced by another encryption-decryption
technique as illustrated in the Figure 3.4.
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3.4 TWO's COMPLIMENT OVERFLOW NONLINEARITY
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Figure 3.4 Encoder-decoder using two's compliment overflow nonlinearity
The encoder-decoder structure with two's compliment overflow non-linearity [2], special
parameter sets and fixed-point, floating point or continuous value realization is used for
coding of speech for another level of encryption.
Basically, this system is a generalized implementation of a simplified delay-based
system. With reference to Figure 3.4, the encryptor portion of the system consists of all
the blocks to the left of the transmission line, whereas the decryptor is located to the
right.
It should be obvious that each key-pair (Gain 1 and Gain 4, Gain 2 and Gain5, Gain 3 and
Gain 6) should have the same key value to ensure that the decryption process produces
the correct recovered plaintext from a givencipher text.
The gains in the feedback loop of the system act as the encryption keys. The value for
each key is obtained from a chaotic sequence generated using the logistic map. The mod
function is recognized as the two's complement non linearity and mathematically defined
as:
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mod(;c) =x- 2. |_(*H)/2j (1)
where x, in this case, is i(k) + K(k), and LJ is a flooring operation.
A simple generalization of delaybasedsystem implementation would then be:
s(k) =mod(i(k) +£ Cjs(k - j)) (4)
and the decoded signal would be:
1(k) =mod(r(k) - Y^c*r(k - j)). (5)
where Cj is the key and identical keys in need to be used in both the encoder and decoder.
The key values are achieved by using the logistic map. But instead of converting the
iterated values from the map to bits of ones andzeroes as done prior to bit swapping, the
iterated values of x(n) itselfwill be used as the key values. This is because the key values
need to be larger than one and never zero.
The block diagram in Figure 3.4 had been implemented in MATLAB Simulink. A C-
standalone was created and was able to execute outside of MATLAB. The author
reviewed the C-codes that were generated and it was completely using Simulink
(MATLAB) API's and libraries linked into the program. Even audio capture (from
microphone) is done via API's in Simulink and MATLAB. The makefile also seems to
indicate the usage of Simulink's owncompiler called LCC to compile the program.
From the findings, the author has discovered that Simulink has the libraries not only
needed to do the mathematical equations but also communicate with the operating system
to interface with the microphone. Unfortunately, the author could not discover a way of
interfacing Matlab / Simulink with network as well, so that the whole system in Figure
4.1 canbemodelled inMATLAB and from there create a standalone. However, assuming
the worst case scenario that Matlab simulink cannot do networking or that the overhead
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interfacing Matlab / Simulink with network as well, so that the whole system in Figure
4.1 can be modelled in MATLAB and from there create a standalone. However, assuming
the worst case scenario that Matlab simulink cannot do networking or that the overhead
of the Matlab Simulink libraries cannot cope with "real-time-ness", then author continued
to simulate the system using Visual C++.
These definitions and steps are implemented in MATLAB using m-files for initial
development. The encryption algorithm was then enhanced and further optimized using
C-coding. The end system is implemented in C and the results that was obtained from the
encryption and decryption for real-time voice data is analyzed using MATLAB. Please
refer to Appendix D to view the C-codes for the proposed two-level encryption scheme
based on chaos. MATLAB provides tools such as spectograms, histograms and power
density spectrum plots which enables one to analyze the input signal, encrypted signal
and the output or decrypted signal. Comparisons and conclusions from the analysis can
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The software' used are MATLAB and Visual C++. The chaotic encryption scheme will
be converted to C-standalone executable program. Hence, this encryptionprogram can be



























Fig. 4.1 Blockdiagram ofproposedsecurity schemefor VoIP
The scheme in the blockdiagram above illustrates that the proposed level one encryption
which is two's compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder-decoder and level two
encryption which is the bit swapping are inserted in the traditional VoIP data flow
between the speech CODEC and the channel CODEC. These operations are controlled by
a chaotic bit string generator based on the chaotic system of a one-dimensional logistic
map. Using the chaotic bit string in the level one and two encryption-decryption
techniques possesses the features of low computational complexity and high security. In
the followingthe author describes the system formally.
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Level one encryption is the two's compliment encoder-decoder and the second level is
the bit swapping function which has been highlighted and discussed in Chapter2 and its
algorithmand implementationin Chapter 3.
To summarize the operation of both, the encoder-decoder in Figure 3.4, replaces the data
frame interleaving. The bit swapping function cannotbe used as a standalone encryption-
decryption scheme and is not secure enough. Hence the introduction of the first level of
encryption before bit swapping. The diffusion technique is used to achieve a certain level
of secrecy or privacy [2]. Diffusion is where the characteristics of the encoded signal are
independent of the information signal.
In the encoder the information signal i(t) has be encoded by the operation q>(i, k) using
the key signal k(t) where the operation is based on a two's compliment overflow linearity
function. The operation is realized by complex scrambling using signal transformations.
The mod function is illustrated as
mod (x) - x-2 * floor ((x+l)/2)
which is the two's compliment nonlinearity. To have the identical key signals, the chaotic
encryption scheme is realized based on a feed back-feed forward control of the encoder
and the decoder by the encoded signal as in Figure 3.4 also known as the self-
synchronizing structure which does notneedan extrasynchronization signal.
The coder states that s (t-j) based on equation (4) and (5) in Chapter 3, is simply time-
delayed versions ofthe encoded signals ofs (t). Lets say for a 3rd order encoder-decoder
pair, to encode sample 7 which is i (7) where n=3 (order), thus the equation in (1) would
be
s (7) - mod (i(t) + (k (1) s(6) + k(2) s(5) + k(3) s(4))
The rangeof s (t) is always limitedto [-1 1] due to the modulo-property.
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The self-synchronizing scheme leads to a dynamical system with chaotic behavior [2].
The sensitivity of the system to the initial condition and the keyvalue and number of key
used, has it made it a suitable candidate to be implemented in this VoIP securitysystem.
Replacing the interleaving block in the HDSP scheme with this encoder-decoder pair has
also another notable advantage. The interleaving techniques groups frames of perhaps 10
and swap the frames with one another. This increases processing delay as all 10 frames
need to be complete before swapping takes place. The encoder-decoder pair on the other
hand, handles samples and receives them in a continues manner. The processing delay is
dependant onlyon the nth orderof the system. If it is of order 16, there would be a delay
of 16 samples which is within microseconds and not perceivable by the human ear. The
speech is also continuously scrambled.
However, the signal s (t), which controls the key generator, is accessible and hence can
be used for cryptanalysis. This is one of the main factors of why a second level of
encryption, the bit swapping is introduced. Thus as the samples s (t) is sent out of the
encoder, it will be further encrypted locally within the sample itself before being sent to
the network.
The intra frame encryption, the pixel value transformation which includes two operations
of bit swapping and XOR operations based on the chaotic bit string b(0),b(l) b(n)
which transforms the original pixel value to an encrypted one. This occurs locally within
the sample. This data encryption approach has the features of low computational
complexity. A factor, which affects processing time, is the number of iterations used.
Increasing the number iteration by a factor of two will double the required processing
time. Hence, instead of iterating the map to the number of samples which is not
necessary, the logistic map is iterated every two values. Two values of x (n) and x (n+1)
will produce 32-bit chaotic bit string. Each 4 bit will be assigned to the first 8 incoming
samples. Once this is completed, the next two values are iterated.
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If a scheme involves with pixel permutation, XOR operation will be included to enhance
the security. But based on the bit-swapping algorithm in Chapter 3, the XOR operation on
each pixel is done outside the permutation looping. In short, after the permutation process
is repeated for a said number of iterations, eachpixel value is XORed with the generated
chaotic bit string.
4.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED SECURITY SYSTEM FOR VOIP
INC
To verify the performance of the two's compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder-
decoder and bit swapping done locally within the sample in the proposed scheme, the
author performed a software simulation using the Visual C++ on test voices. Figure 4.2
illustrates the simulation environment.
Audio Capture Audio Stream Encrypt Thread Audio Stream Send
Network
Audio Stream Receive Audio Stream Decrypt Thread Audio Stream Playback
Fig 4.2 Block diagram of encryption-decryption simulation environment using the proposed two-level
encryption schemes
NETWORK
Fig. 4.3 Block diagram ofsimulation environment
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The proposed system will be simulated on a setup such as the one in Figure 4.3. Two
computers running the standalone application will be connected via the local area
network (LAN).
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Fig. 4.4 User interface
Each application will have a dialog box as the user interface as such in Figure 4.3. The
receiver will click on the 'Receive, Decrypt and Playback' button and awaits the sender's
response. The sender clicks on the 'Record from Mic' button and speaks into the
microphone. The voice input will be captured every say for every l/25th ofa second and
stored into a global buffer. A sampling rate of 11025 KHz at 8 bits per sample is used
which means that 11025 KHz / 25 will give 441 bytes per network packet. These
parameters are user-definable in the codes audio_param.h attached in Appendix E and are
used for testing purposes.
As said earlier, every l/25th of a second, it will record from microphone and store the
samples byte by byte it into a global buffer. The buffer will consist of 25 packets each
containing 441 bytes. Each slot will have a flag. Thus if, slot one has captured all 441
bytes, the flag will be set to 1. The encryption thread will check the flag status. If 1,
sample by sample (8 bits per sample) will be sent to the first level of encryption which is
the two's compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder. Once encrypted, it will store the
encrypted output in a local buffer. Then, byte by byte will be encrypted using the bit
swapping function. Once encrypted, the samples will be packetised in TCP packets to the
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receiver side. At the receiver end, the decryption thread will receive the packet and
decrypt in reverse order, second level decryption followed by first level. Once decrypted,
it will store samples into the global buffer for playback.
Only one thread is used on both sides of encryption and decryption. To enhance the
efficiency of the system and decrease processing delay, there can be two encryption
threads for both level of encryptions so that the encryption of both levels can be done
simultaneously and no need for intermediate buffers. This is to be applied to the
decryption side as well.
The size of frame/packet should be carefully selected so that it has lower latency and
overhead processing. The smaller the packet size, the better error recovery and will
reduce the end-to-end delay in a VoIP system.
The TCP transport protocol is not suitable for the VoIP applications because of its
complex retransmission mechanism. For this reason, all the VoIP applications at present
transmit via the UDP transport protocol. However, assuming that the delay is minimal
and less than 240ms, TCP is used in this transmission because the proposed system does
not offer a framework for packet loss. Hence, using UDP may cause the packet loss to be
critical resulting in the recovered signal or voice on the receiver end to seem as if it was
not decrypted completely. Hence for simulation purposes and to demonstrate the
workability of the two-level encryption scheme by assuming minimal delay on the LAN,
TCP was adapted into the system.
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4.3 SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS RESULTS
The AES encryption scheme is used to compare against the symmetric chaoticencryption
scheme and will be discussed in the following sections.
The MATLAB implementation of the AES encryption was obtained from
http://buchhloz.hs-bremen.de/aes/aes.htm. This encryption scheme is used to compare
against the symmetric chaotic encryption scheme and will be discussed in the following
sections. These m-files were compared to the AES standards to ensure its validity. This
implementation of AES is fully operational but only does not optimize speed. For each of
the first Nr-1 iterations or rounds, it performs a substitution operation called Sub Bytes
on State using an S-Box; perform a permutation Shift Rows on State; perform an
operation Mix Columns on State; and perform AddRoundKey.
The key for the chaotic encoder-decoder had been synchronized and obtainedby iterating
the logistic map for n times where n is equivalent to the number of keys used. For
comparison with AES, the keys for the chaotic encryption have been set to 128 bits as
equivalent to the AES key length.
4.3.1 Spectrogram Analysis
The spectrogramfunction in MATLAB divides a long signal into windows and performs
a Fourier Transform on each window. It basically shows the reader what is the frequency
content of the signal at any point of time. It produces a pseudo color display of spectral
energy with frequency on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis. The colors
represent the most important acoustic peaks for a given time frame, with red representing
the highest energies, then in decreasing order of importance, orange, yellow, green, cyan,
blue, and magenta, with gray areas having even less energy and white areas below a
threshold decibel level. For a given spectrogram, S the strength of a frequencycomponent
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fat a given time of t is represented by the darkness or the colorof the corresponding point
S(f,t).
The spectrogram in Figure 4.5 in the following page illustrates the voice signal "Hello.
Testing 1, 2, 3." An experienced spectrogramreader would be able to identify the words
from the patterns in the image above. The vertical line patterns in red and blue could
depict the sounds of the certain alphabet at the end of a word or syllable. The other
speech sounds or phonemes are equally distinctive in their shapes. It is not possible to
obtain or read the phonemes from a normal speech waveform. However, when analyzing
the frequency contentof the waveform, a spectrogram is produced as above which can be
deciphered. Nevertheless, the distinctive shapes, patterns and colors need to be present in
order to be able to identify the words.
The spectrogram in Figure 4.5(b) shows that the signal has been distorted and also
displays onlyno significant frequency or energy content. Hereby, no distinctive shapes or
patterns are seen and the rows of frequency content are not at all visible for a code
crackerto makeout the speech that is being said. It is impossible to distinguish or deduce
the original signal from it since there are no distinctive significance betweenthe original
signal and the encrypted one.
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Figure 4.S Spectrogram of(a) original voice signal, (b) encrypted signal and
(c) decryptedsignal using chaotic encryption scheme
The decrypted signal as in Figure 4.5(c) is not 100% similar to the original signal though
theoretically it should be the same. The author suggests that the blue line in the original
signal and the yellow line in the decrypted occurs at the same instance for any recording,
and may be caused by internal hardware. However, when the decrypted signal is played
back, it sounds exactly as the original signal with no distortion or noise corrupting it.
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4.3.2 Comparison between Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and
Symmetric Chaotic Encryption
To compare AES and chaos, a speech signal "Hello.wav" was used and the results are
shown in the figuresbelow and both encryptionschemes using 128-bitkey.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the speech signal that was fed into both the AES and chaos
encryption scheme. The signal that was sent it is identical and thus only the method of
encryption will hence produce different results in the encrypted as illustrated in Figure
4.7 (a) and (b).
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Figure 4.6 Spectrogram oforiginal voice signal
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Figure 4.7 The encryptedsignal displayed using a spectrogramfor (a) 128-bit AES
and (b) Chaos
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Figure 4,8 Spectrogram ofdecrypted voice signal using (a)AESand (b) Chaos
The encrypted signal for AES in Figure 4.7 (a) shows all kinds of frequency content and
is clearly distorted if compared to the original one. As mentioned earlier, for any speech
signal to be read from the spectrogram, it has to have distinctive shapes and patterns,
which is clearly not the case for this image of the spectrogram. Even Chaos in Figure
4.7(b) displays the same kind of characteristics; randomly distorted with no distinctive
patterns and the rows of frequencies is not visible as the original image. Only the energy
content in both this these spectrograms differ. If the key values were changed, the cipher
text obtained was totally different from one another though resulting in the same
decrypted spectrogram. Since this is the portion to be viewed by the code cracker, it
43
would be hard to pick out any kind of frequency variation and read out the phonemes, as
there is no significant resemblance to the original spectrogram.
For AES, since the decryption process is just an inverse of encryption, thus the original
signal is hence recovered with not the slightest changes to it. For chaos however, there is
a slight shift to the right in the decrypted signal. Based on the Figure 3.4, for any given
signal encrypted by chaos, the decryptedportion of the signal experiences a slight shift to
the right or in other words a delay due to the delay system used in the encryption-
decryptionblock. But the delay is not obvious nor is it perceivable to human ears.
Using another wav file produced the results as illustrated in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10(a)
and (b) and Figure 4.11(a) and (b).
-JDf*l
Fft Bit Mr* Inert Took WMoti m I
liDfSHflf "t A J> / 1J9B ->
40I»^|L
•


















Figure 4.9 The originalfde beingfed to theAESand Chaos
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Figure 4.10 The encryptedsignal displayed using a spectrogramfor 128-bit (a) AES
and (b) Chaos
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Figure 4,11 The decrypted signalfor (a) AES and (b) Chaos
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4.3.3 Power Spectral Density and Histogram Analysis
The power spectral density is to describe the distribution of the power containedin the
signal over frequency. According [32], the estimation of this power spectral density is






Figure 4.12 Power spectral densityplot of(a) original voice signal, (b) encryptedsignal
and (c) decryptedsignal using chaotic encryption scheme
The noise like signal in Figure 4.6(b) is close to that of white noise. This is because, it
portrays the characteristics of white noise in terms of being uncorrelated, completed
random and has a relatively flat spectrum. The closer it is to white noise, the better.
This is because white noise is uncorrelated meaning there is no implication of the
relationship between the original signal and the noise produced. Also, detecting the
significant frequencies from a relatively uniformed signal as in Figure 4.6(b) is a
highly difficult task. Hence recovering the original signal would take more time and
effort for the code cracker. The case of uniformity can be further illustrated with a
histogram analysis. The histogram block computes the frequency distribution of the
elements in each column of the input, or tracks the frequency distribution in a
sequence of inputs over a period of time. The histogram values represent the
frequency of occurrence of the input values
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Figure 4.13 Histogram plots of(a) original (b) encrypted and (c) decrypted voice signal using
chaotic encryption scheme.
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The original signal in Figure 4.13(a) is seen to have significantly high and low
frequencies unlike the encrypted one in (b) for which the frequencies occur more closely
to one another and there are no significantly high and low levels of frequencies.
From the figure in 4.13(b), the histogram plot is seen to be relatively uniform. It is harder
to detect the original frequencies from uniformity as depicted in (b) and less information
is perceived from a poor intensity distribution.
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Figure 4.14 Power spectral densityplot ofvoice signal using (a) AES and (b) Chaos
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Figure 4.15Power spectral densityplot of encrypted voice signalusing (a)AES,
(b) and(c) Chaos using different key values
Based on the power spectral density plots gathered on both the encrypted signal and
original signal using chaotic encryption, the noise signal or encrypted one, there is no
significant similarity in pattern between the original signal and the encrypted one. The
original signal depicts a typical voice signal, which decays at the end as the voice gets cut
off.
Both encrypted signals using AES and Chaos are randomly distorted using different
methods, producing almost similar power spectral density plots. However, the encrypted
data has been spread quite uniformly over the frequency range for AES using 128 bits
and for Chaos in Figure 4.14(b) and (c) which uses different key values. The noise like
signal is close to that of white noise. This is because, it is uncorrelated, completed
random andhas a relatively flat spectrum. Spreading thedatauniformly is a good thing as
it makes it harder for code cracker. He or she has to have a device to listen to all
frequency range. Listening to all freq range is also difficult as there will be other
frequency signal like TV, Radio, andmobile phone. Having said that, comparing AES in
(a) and Chaotic in (c), the magnitude of Chaotic (10A-2 to 10A2) is higher than the
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magnitude of AES (10A-1 to 10A1). This means the chaotic signal carried more power
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Figure 4.16 Power spectral densityplot ofdecryptedvoice signal using (a) AES and (b) Chaos
Once again the case ofuniformity can be further explained using the histogram plots.
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Figure 4.17 Histogramplot oforiginal voice signal
(a) (b)
Figure 4.18 Histogram plot ofencrypted signal using (a) AES and (b) Chaos
As observed, the histogram plots from the output of encryption in Figure 4.17 are almost
similar and uniformly distributed for both AES and Chaos encryption scheme. Thus this
is also indicates a certain potential possessed by a chaos system to produce encryption
results as similar to that of the existing standards such as AES.
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Figure 4.19 Histogram plots ofdecrypted signal using (a) AES and (b) Chaos
4.3.5 Time-Waveform Analysis
Using a wave file "Hello.wav", the illustrations in Figure 4.20 and 4.21 shows that the
time waveforms of the encrypted signal from both the AES and chaotic encryption
scheme were noise like broadband power spectrum. The output was completely erratic
andwhen played back, wascompletely unintelligible.
The author observed a DC shift in the decrypted signal obtained from the chaotic
encryption when compared to the original signal. Since this a trivial issue and was
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Figure 4.21 P/etf of(a) Original signal, (b) encryptedand(c) decryptedsignal using Chaos
encryption scheme
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4.4 CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS
From the observation and results, it can be deduced that chaotic encryption schemes have
a good future and have produced attractive results, which can be further researched and
enhanced.
Though both the AES and Chaos based encryption schemes deploy random
characteristicsto encrypt the incoming data be it voice, text or video, but the outcome of
the encryption still differs due to the operation or method used to encrypt the data.
From the author's understanding, on "what makes a good encryption algorithm", though
not complete, is outlined as below:
• Iterations required per sample
• Speed of encryption and decryptions
• Error propagation (when you iterate something, i.e. current outputdepends on the
previous output etc, they tend to produce error propagation)
Thus, these are the criteria to look into when comparing two encryption schemes.
Encryption strength would relate to the time it would take to decryptnot having the right
key. In this case, the algorithm is unknown and attempts are being made to detect an
encrypted signal disguised as noise. Having detected the presence of a signal, an attempt
to decrypt it will depend on whether the code cracker has access to the encryption
algorithm and has to figure out the key, or on whether the encryption method has to be
worked out as well. Looking at AES and Chaos based encryption and the corresponding
results, the noise signal obtained is completely random, and thus with a power density
spectral which is relatively uniformly distributed, it does not indicate any similarity in
pattern corresponding to original signal which could provide anypossibility to decrypt it.
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Be it for audio, text, video or image, based on [1] and [10], there are no known
cryptanalysis attacks to have worked on AES and due to its operations especially the key
expansion operation which fulfills the design criteria to reduce the symmetric
characteristics of the encryption scheme and round transformations; it is highly resistive
against attacks especially as the number ofrounds (iterations) increases.
Chaos on the other hand, possessing characteristics ofrandomness, stochastic and mixed-
ergodic, enhances the security of the encryption process by the means of a chaotic
dynamical map. With reference to the results obtained, it can be said that the chaotic
encryption scheme is quite attractive to be used as replacement for currently existing
standards. The cipher text is seen to be a very erratic plot compared to the plaintext. It
was observed that for audio encryption, the system shows great sensitivity to initial
conditions, changes in number ofkeys and changes in key values. Using asingle channel
voice data as input, thecipher textobtained was a noise-like sound.
Itwas observed that, with the key value zeroes; the encryption did not have any effect on
the signal. But when the key values were greater than zero, the cipher text was
successfully obtained. This has to be looked into, as sometimes, the key values are picked
at random and may give anall zero value. To avoid this, the logistic map is used toobtain
chaotic values between 0 and 1.
Based on the author in [1], the fractal dimensions of the original and encrypted voice
should range from 1.7 to 1.9. Since the maximal fractal dimension for a one-dimensional
curve is 2.0000, all the encryption results is said to be in a state of chaos.
In [4], it is mentioned that statistical analysis needs to be conducted on the publicly
available encrypted signal at the encoder-decoder. The principle behind this is to create
statistical measure based on the encoded signal and key parameters and then try to
estimate the keys. This is much similar to the exhaustive scheme used in cryptanalysis
although the former is supported by statistical data. Although it is easy to break an
encryption using this type of analysis, it was pointed out by the author that choosing a
larger key set from a larger setwould increase the time taken to estimate the keys. The
60
table below illustrates the number of days taken to estimate the key with an accuracy of
0.1 in coefficients.
Table 4.1. Time taken to estimate key based on order deployed in encoder-decoder






The issue of security for this scheme still needs to be resolved since this implementation
has not dealt with the level of secrecy of the encryption scheme.
The secrecy level of this chaotic encryption though not greater should be equally as good
as the existing standards such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Though, the
level as of encryption for chaos is greater with increasing number of keys, however, a
bettersolution is to have a smaller number of keys but able to produce the same level of
security andsecrecy. The AES encryption provides this ability being able to only use one
key to encrypt and decrypt butwith the choice of 128,192 and 256 bits. Forthis analysis,
only the 128 bitkey was used. The encoder-decoder had to have an order of 8 delays to
produce a set of 128-bit key. With the bit swapping algorithm aiding the encoder-
decoder, the encrypted signal produced by chaos is almost similar to the one produced by
theAES encryption scheme as observed in the illustrations above.
Pertaining to the issue on the security of the symmetric key, an alternative would be to
integrate the chaos encryption with Public-Key Infi-astructure based encryption such as
theRSA.
61
To enhance the security of symmetric chaotic encryption, the integration between a
symmetric encryption and PKI based encryption also using chaos would prove to be a
work around to reduce the probability of the key being known to a code cracker. The
symmetric key or keys used to encrypt the plaintext is encrypted using the public key
before sending it over the transmission line to the receiver. Only the receiver is aware of
his or her private key and hence will be able to decrypt the symmetric key, obtain it and
use it to decrypt the cipher text. In this case, even the receiver need not know of the
symmetric key to be used before hand.





Cryptography provides a solution to the problem of information security and privacy.
Encryption is the correct method to implement confidentiality for Internet traffic. VoIP
technology is progressing admirably, but certain drawbacks have been indicated such as
packet loss, propagation delay, jitter, unreliable IP networks, and vulnerability to attacks
by Internet hackers. Thus, it is essential to perform dataencryption on voice transmitted
over theInternet while preserving the quality of the voice from packet loss.
Chaos, a relatively new science is open for exploitation in broadranging fields. Chaos
has attracted much attention in the field of cryptography for private and secure
communications due to its deterministic nature and its sensitivity to initial values. Such
properties mean that chaos has certain potential in creating a new way of securing
information to be transmitted or stored. It is a simple method of encryption and can be
achieved by iteration with a high levelof security.
This project allowed the author study, develop and implement a chaotic encryption
scheme. The project proposes a chaotic encryption scheme based on a chaotic system
whichwillpreserve data security for real-time voicedata encryption. Thisproject work is
based on the scheme in [1] and proposes a two-level encryption decryption scheme based
on the two's compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder-decoder and bit swapping. This
scheme will apply to a VoIP network.
With regards to the objectives outlined in Chapter 1, which is to implement a two-level
encryption-decryption scheme for voice data, this project is considered successful. The
author has successfiilly drawn up a new scheme and tested it across the local area
network. The results and observations has been laid and discussed in Chapter4 as well as
compared to the AES encryption scheme. From observations, the encrypted signal of the
chaoticencryption schemeis almostsimilarto that of the AES encryption.
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Due to time constrainthowever, the author,had not dealt withIhe analysisof the security
level of the scheme. However since the scheme was based on the [1] and [2], this issue
has been solved by referring to arguments presented in the two, which has also been
discussed in Chapter 4. However, it is to be noted that these arguments cannot be one
hundred percent be used to validate the algorithms strength and level of security. It is
hence recommended that future work will deal with this issue and proper cryptanalysis
measures be taken to test and validate the algorithms implemented. To warrant an
algorithm as secure, it has to be proven to resist attacks. Mathematical functions such
autocorrelation that for a highly random signal produces a delta function and zero
elsewhere and fractal dimensions calculationsas in [1] should also be included.
Based on the discussion in Chapter 4, the codes provided in the appendices can be further
optimized by increasing the number of threads to encrypt and decrypt as to decrease the
processing delay. Also, the packetization using TCP should be replaced by UDP before
implementing in a WAN or MAN based environment. However, the scheme should be
enhanced and a framework for packet loss must be considered.
Since the codes have been written as a stand-alone C program, it can be further used for
FPGA implementation and for the use of smart card based solution. From the author's
own understanding and reading, chaotic encryption can be realized to be a powerful tool
in cryptography if exploited and researched further. This chaotic encryption scheme can
be further analyzed, fully realized and implemented on hardware or other areas, which
can be explored further.
In short, the author has managed to implement a two-level encryption-decryption scheme
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APPENDIX C
Table 1 Ashort catalog ofchaotic discrete maps.
Map Definition Chaotic Regime
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The C codes attached run the encryption-decryption program on the user's terminal. The
audio capture and playback files are generated based on the sample codes provided in the
Internet and the MSDN library-April 2003.
Aud__StreamlDlg.cpp- the behavior of your application's main dialog.
Aud_Strm_DSnd_Cap.cpp - to create the capture sound buffer
Aud_Strm_DSnd_Play. cpp- to create the playback sound buffer
Aud_Strm_Encrypt.cpp -contains the two's compliment overflow nonlinearity encoder-decoder
and bit swapping.
Aud_Strm_Net_Send. cpp and Aud_Strm_Net_Recv. cpp - to create the socket and send/receive
TCP voice packets.
Aud_param.h - contains the user definable parameters i.e. sampling frequency, bits per
sample and mono or stereo channel.
//Aud_Streantl. cpp














// NOTE - the ClassWizard will add and remove mapping macros here.








// TODO: add construction code here,
// Place all significant initialization in Initlnstance
}
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////







// If you are not using these features and wish to reduce the size
// of your final executable, you should remove from the following
// the specific initialization routines you do not need.
CAud_StreamlDlg dig;
m_pMainWnd = Sdlg;
int nResponse = dig.DoModal();
if (nResponse == IDOK)
{
// TODO: Place code here to handle when the dialog is
// dismissed with OK
}
else if (nResponse == IDCANCEL)
{
// TODO: Place code here to handle when the dialog is
// dismissed with Cancel
// Since the dialog has been closed, return FALSE so that we exit the
















Static char THIS_FILE[] = FILE
#endif





// CAboutDlg dialog used for App About






enum ( IDD - IDD_ABOUTBOX };
//}}AFX_DATA
// ClassWizard generated virtual function overrides
//{{AFX_VIRTUAL(CAboutDlg)
protected:





























// NOTE: the ClassWizard will add member initialization here
//}}AFX_DATA_INIT

























// Add "About..." menu item to system menu.
// IDM_ABOUTBOX must be in the system command range.
ASSERT((IDM_ABOUTBOX S OxFFFO) == IDM_ABOUTBOX);
ASSERT(IDM_ABOUTBOX < OxFOOO);
CMenu* pSysMenu = GetSystemMenu(FALSE);
if (pSysMenu != NULL)
CString strAboutMenu;
strAboutMenu.LoadString(IDS_ABOUTBOX);
if (! strAboutMenu.IsEmptyO )
{
pSysMenu->AppendMenu(MF_SEPARATOR);
pSysMenu->AppendMenu (MF__STRING, IDM ABOUTBOX, strAboutMenu)
// Set the icon for this dialog. The framework does this automatically
// when the application's main window is not a dialog
SetIcon(ra_hIcon, TRUE); // Set big icon
SetIcon(m_hIcon, FALSE); // Set small icon
// TODO: Add extra initialization here
started_from_main= 0;
return TRUE; // return TRUE unless you set the focus to a control
void CAud_StreamlDlg::OnSysCommand(UINT nID, LPARAM lParam)
{








// If you add a minimize button to your dialog, you will need the code below
// to draw the icon. For MFC applications using the document/view model,





CPaintDC dc(this); // device context for painting
SendMessage(WM_ICONERASEBKGND, (WPARAM) dc.GetSafeHdc(), 0);
// Center icon in client rectangle
int cxlcon = GetSystemMetrics(SM_CXICON);
int cylcon = GetSystemMetrics(SM_CYICON);
CRect rect;
GetClientRect(srect);
int x = {rect.Widthf) ~ cxlcon +1) / 2;
int y = (rect.Height() - cylcon + 1) / 2;
}
else
// Draw the icon
dc.Drawlcon(x, y, m hlcon);
CDialog::OnPaint
}
// The system calls this to obtain the cursor to display while the user drags






// TODO: Add your control notification handler code here
int loop;

















_beginthread((void(_cdecl*)(void*))Aud_Strm_Encrypt_Fifo_Thread, 0, (void *)
&Enc_Params);








// TODO: Add your control notification handler code here
int loop;

















_beginthread((void( cdecl*)(void*))Aud_Strn_Decrypt_Fifojrhread, 0, (void *)
SEnc_Params);

















II TODO: Add extra validation here
if(started_fron_main)
{






// Name: DspMsg(NULL, NULL, x,y,...)
// Desc: Displayes debug messages on the main screen
//





void FAR *VarArgList = (LPSTR *)&msgfmt + 1;
HFONT hfnt,ofnt,hobj;
wvsprintff msgbf,msgfmt,(char *)VarArgList );




hDc = GetDC( hWnd );
hfnt = (HFONT)SendMessage( hWnd,WM_GETFONT,0,0L );




hobj = (struct HFONT *)SelectObject( hDc,GetStockObject(SYSTEM_FIXED_FONT)
while ( *txbf )
{
pel = __fstrchr( txbf,'\n' );
if ( pel ) *pcl++ - 0;
TextOut( hDc,x,y,txbf,lstrlen(txbf) );






















// used for direct sound - because it's COM
// needed for Windows Multimedia API
// direct sound header file










g_aCapPosNotify [ NUM__PACKETS + 1 ];
g hCaptureNotificationEvents[NUM PACKETS + i;
int _cdecl DspMsg( HWND hWnd, HDC hDc, int x, int y, LPSTR msgfmt, .
//
// Name: InitDirectSoundCapture()
// Desc: Initilizes DirectSound for capture
//
HRESULT InitDirectSoundCapture! HWND hDlg )
{
HRESULT hr;
// Free the memory for DirectSound notification structure






//create the DirectSoundCapture object





// Desc: Sets the notifications on the capture buffer which are handled





if' NULL == g_pDSBCapture
return E FAIL;
// Create the notification interface
iff FAILED( hr = g_pDSBCapture->QueryInterface
(VOID**)&g_pDSNotify ) ) )
return hr;
IID__IDirectSoundNotify,
// Setup the notification positions
for( int i = 0; i < NUM_PACKETS; i++ )
{
g_aCapPosNotify[i].dwOffset - ((PACKET SIZE * i) + PACKET SIZE) %(NUM PACKETS *
PACKET_SIZE);
g_aCapPosNotify[i].hEventNotify = g_hCaptureNotificationEvents[i];







// Desc: Sets the format, creates a capture buffer, set notifications for
// DirectSound Capture and initialize the network for multicasting.
HRESULT CreateCaptureBuffer(int freq, int bits__per_sample, int channels)
HRESULT hr; // keep error message if any
DSCBUFFERDESC dscbd;// Create a DirectSound buffer description structure
WAVEFORMATEX wfcap; // Create a wave format structure
// Release and free the memory for the wave format structure
ZeroMemory (&wfcap, sizeof (WAVEFORMATEX));
// Release and free the memory for the DirectSound capture and notify structure
SAFE_FREE( g_pDSNotify );
SAFE_FREE( g_pDSBCapture );
// Sets the wave format
wfcap.wFormatTag = WAVE_FORMAT_PCM;
wfcap.nChannels = channels;
wfcap.nSamplesPerSec = freq; //11025;
wfcap.wBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;//16
wfcap.nBlockAlign - wfcap.nChannels * wfcap.wBitsPerSample / 8;
wfcap.nAvgBytesPerSec = wfcap.nBlockAlign * wfcap.nSamplesPerSec;
SAFE_FREE( g_pDSNotify );
SAFE_FREE f g_pDSBCapture );
// Sets the capture buffer description
ZeroMemoryf sdscbd, sizeof(dscbd) );
dscbd.dwSize = sizeof(dscbd);
dscbd.dwFlags = DSCBCAPS_WAVEMAPPED ;
dscbd.dwBufferBytes = 1 * wfcap.nAvgBytesPerSec;//CAP_BUFFER SIZE ; //5512 ; //l
wfcap.nAvgBytesPerSec;
dscbd.IpwfxFormat = (LPWAVEFORMATEX) swfcap; // Set the format during creation
// Create the DirectSound capture buffer
if{ FAILED( hr = g_pDSCapture->CreateCaptureBuffer( sdscbd,
&g_pDSBCapture, NULL ) ) )
return hr;
// Set notifications for DirectSound Capture


















// Name: Aud_Strm__DS_Capture ()
// Desc: threaded function that captures wave data from mic via DirectSound
//













unsigned int * done;
HWND g_hDlg;
unsigned int fifo index;
if(!params)
AfxMessageBox("DS CAPT NO PARAMS!", MB_OK, NULL);
_endthread();
}









//Get the handle to the foreground window




//create some event handles used later for DS capture notifcations
for (loopl = 0; loopl<NUM_PACKETS ; ++loopl)
{
gJiCaptureNotificationEvents[loopl] = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE,
NULL);
if (NULL == g_hCaptureNotificationEvents[loopl])
{






iff FAILED( InitDirectSoundCapture( g_hDlg ) ) )
{






// Create the sound capture buffer
iff FAILED! CreateCaptureBuffer(frequency, bits sample, channel) ) )
{






// Start recording sound from mic
// Tell the capture buffer to start recording
iff FAILED( hr = g_pDSBCapture->Start( DSCBSTART_LOOPING ) ) )
{







// This is the loop for processing the event which is capturing audio.
while( !*done )
{
index = MsgWaitForMultipleObjects( NUM_PACKETS, g_hCaptureNotificationEvents,
FALSE, 1000, QS_ALLEVENTS);
// This means that DirectSound just finished filling
// a section of the buffer, so we need to fill the




if(!FAILED( hr = g_pDSBCapture->Lock( PACKET_SIZE * index,
PACKET_SIZE,
(LPVOID *) &ptr_to_ds_data,








ptr_to_ds data, ds data size);
memcpyf(unsigned char *)global_fifo[index].sample bits,
%d",index,ds data size);




// Stop the recording
g_pDSBCapture->Stop f);






// Unlock the capture buffer
g_pDSBCapture->Unlockf ptr_to_ds_data, ds data size, NULL,
global fifo[index],filled = 1;











#include <mmsystem.h>// used for multimedia wave format structure - audio mixer in this
case
#include <objbase.h>// used for direct sound - because it's COM
#include <mmreg.h> // needed for Windows Multimedia API
jfinclude <dsound.h> // direct sound header file
#include <process.h> // needed for multithreading
//#include "windowsx.h"
LPDIRECTSOUND 9_pDS = NULL;
LPDIRECTSOUNDBUFFER pDSBPrimary = NULL;
LPDIRECTSOUNDBUFFER g_pDSPlayBuffer = NULL;
LPDIRECTSOUNDNOTIFY gjpDSPlayNotify = NULL;
DSBPOSITIONNOTIFY g_aPlayPosNotify[NUM_PACKETS + 1];
HANDLE g_hPlayNotificationEvents[NUM__PACKETS + 1] ;
static WAVEFORMATEX wfplay;
int _cdecl DspMsgl HWND hWnd, HDC hDc, int x, int y, LPSTR msgfmt, ... );
//
// Name: InitDirectSoundPlayback()
// Desc: Initilizes DirectSound for playback
//







// Create IDirectSound using the primary sound device
iff FAILED) hr = DirectSoundCreate( NULL,'Sg_pDS, NULL ) ) )
return hr;
// Set coop level to DSSCL_PRIORITY so that wave volume can be set
if( FAILED ( hr = g__pDS->SetCooperativeLevel ( hDlg, DSSCL_PRIORITY )))
return hr;
// Get the primary buffer
DSBUFFERDESC dsbd;
ZeroMemory( sdsbd, sizeof(DSBUFFERDESC) );
dsbd.dwSize = sizeof(DSBUFFERDESC);
dsbd.dwFlags - DSBCAPS_PRIMARYBUFFER | DSBCAPS_CTRLVOLUME;
dsbd.dwBufferBytes = 0;
dsbd.lpwfxFormat = NULL;
// Create a primary audio playback buffer
iff FAILED( hr = g_pDS->CreateSoundBuffer( sdsbd, spDSBPrimary, NULL ;
return hr;
// Set primary buffer format to 44kHz, 8-bit and mono output.





wfplay.nBlockAlign = wfplay.wBitsPerSample / 8 * wfplay.nChannels,
wfplay.nAvgBytesPerSec = wfplay.nSamplesPerSec * wfplay.nBlockAlign;
iff FAILED( hr = pDSBPrimary->SetFormat(Swfplay) ) )
return hr;










// Release DirectSoundCapture interfaces for listening
SAFE_FREE(g_pDSPlayNotify);









// Desc: Creates a streaming buffer, and the notification events to handle








// Release and free the memory for the notification structure
ZeroMemory( &g_aPlayPosNotify, sizeof(DSBPOSITIONNOTIFY) *
(NUM_PACKETS +1) );//start to comment here
// Sets the playback buffer description
// Set up the direct sound buffer, and only request the flags needed
// since each requires some overhead and limits if the buffer can
// be hardware accelerated
ZeroMemoryf Sdsbd, sizeof(DSBUFFERDESC) );
dsbd.dwSize = sizeof(DSBUFFERDESC);
dsbd.dwFlags = DSBCAPS_CTRLPOSITIONNOTIFY | // Needed for notification
DSBCAPS_GETCURRENTPOSITION2 |
DSBCAPS_GLOBALFOCUS;
dsbd.dwBufferBytes = 1 * wfplay.nAvgBytesPerSec;
dsbd.lpwfxFormat = fLPWAVEFORMATEX) Swfplay;
// Create a DirectSound buffer
if! FAILED! hr = g_pDS->CreateSoundBuffer( sdsbd, &g_pDSPlayBuffer, NULL )))
return hr;






DSBLOCK_ENTIREBUFFER ) ) )
{




// Fill with silence
memset (_j)bBuffer, 0x7f, dwBufferLength) ;
}
// Unlock the playback buffer




// Desc: sets up the direct sound notification by setting






for {loopl = 0; loopl<NUM_PACKETS ; ++loopl)
[


























// Name: Aud__Strm_DS_Play ()
// Desc: threaded function that plays
// back wave data from global buffer via DirectSound
//













unsigned int * done;
HWND g_hDlg;
void * pblnputl = NULL;






AfxMessageBox("DS PLAY NO PARAMS!", MB_OK, NULL);
_endthread();
1








//Get the handle to the foreground window
if (g hDlg == NULL)
{
g_hDlg = GetDesktopWindow(
//create some event handles used later for DS playback notifcations
for (loopl = 0; loopK NUM_PACKETS; ++loopl)
{
g_hPlayNotificationEvents[loopl] = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
if {NULL == g_hPlayNotificationEvents[loopl])
{






iff FAILED(InitDirectSoundPlayback(g_hDlg, frequency, bits_sample, channel) ) )
{
MessageBox(NULL, "Error Initializing DirectSound Playback", "Aud_Play" ,
MBJDK) ;





// Create the sound buffer object from the data
iff FAILED(CreateStreamingPlaybackBuffer() ) )
f
MessageBox! g_hDlg, "Error Creating DirectSound Playback Buffer.",
"Aud_Play", MB_OK);






iff FAILED(InitPlaybackNotifications() ) )
{
MessageBox(NULL, "Error Setting-up Playback Notifications", "Aud_Play" ,
MBjDK) ;











DspMsg (0,0,200,250,"playback start 1");
if(fifo_index == NUM_PACKETS)
fifo__index = 0;





DspMsg (0,0,200,250,"playback start 3");
g_pDSPlayBuffer->GetStatus(sstatus) ;
iff Status S DSBSTATUS_BUFFERLOST )
{
g_pDSPlayBuffer->Restore() ;
g_pDSPlayBuffer->Play( 0, 0, DSBPLAY_LOOPING );
}
DspMsg (0,0,200,250,"playback start 4");
play_index = MsgWaitForMultipleObjects(NUM_PACKETS, // How many
g_hPlayNotificationEvents,// Location of handles
FALSE, // Wait for all?
1000, // How long to wait
QS_ALLEVENTS); // Any message is an event





if (play_index > (NUM_PACKETS - 1))
play_index -= NUM_PACKETS;









MessageBox(NULL,"Playback Buffer Lock failed", "Aud_Play",
global_fifo[fifo_index].filled=0;
++fifo__index;














DspMsg (0,0,300,400,"play to direct sound = %d size -
++fifo__index;

























int ctr = 0;
long double x[3] ;
long double log_val[4];
double key[DELAY];




int _cdecl DspMsgf HWND hWnd, HDC hDc, int x, int y, LPSTR msgfmt, ...






log_val[n+l]=3.6 * log_val[n] * (l-log_val[n]);




return (x - 2 * floor((x +1) 12));
}
void Aud_Strm_Encrypt_Sample(unsigned char *input_val, unsigned char *output_val)
{
double temp_val[PACKET_SIZE], intermediate_val[PACKET_SIZE];











for (i=0; i<PACKET_SIZE; i++)
{
intermediate_val[i]=((double)input val[i])/255.0;




for (i=0; i<PACKET_SIZE; i++)
{
sum_val = 0.0;
for (j=l; j<=DELAY; j++)
{
sum_val = sum_val + enc_sig_buffer[j-1]*key[j-i;
)
temp_val[i]=mod(intermediate_val[i]+sum_val);
for (k=DELAY; k>0; k—)
{
encoded_sig = enc_sig_buffer[k-1];






















for (i=0; i<PACKET_SIZE; i++)
{
output_val[i]=(unsigned char)(((intermediate val[i])/max s val new)*255;
void Aud_Strm_Decrypt_Sample(unsigned char *input_val, unsigned char *output_val'
{
double temp_val [PACKET__SIZE] ,
intermediate_val[PACKET_SIZE];//,intermediate_temp[PACKET_SIZE];;













for (i=0; i<PACKET_SIZE; i++)
f
enc_sig__buffer [i] = 0.0;
}
for (i=0; i<PACKET_SIZE; i++)
{
sum_val = 0.0;
for (j=l; j<=DELAY; j++)
{
sum_val = sum_val + key[j-1]*enc_sig_buffer[j-1];
}
temp_val [i] =mod(intermediate_val [i] -sum__val) ;
if ftemp_val[i] < 0)
{
temp_val[i] = temp_val[i] * (-1.0);
)
for (k=DELAY; k>0; k—)
{
encoded_signal = enc_sig_buffer[k-1];














x[l] = 0; /* dont matter coz will be derived later from map*/
x[2] = 0; /* dont matter coz will be derived later from map*/
ctr = 0;





x[l] = 0; /* dont matter coz will be derived later from map*/
x[2] = 0; /* dont matter coz will be derived later from map*/
ctr = 0;
// next sample will be the first.
1






if (ctr % 4 == 0) //checking for





x[l]=3.9 * x[0] * fl-x[0]); //generating chaotic

























temp_bool = sample__bit [i] ;
sample__bit [i] = sample_bit [i+4] ;
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void cdecl Aud_Strm_Encrypt_Fifo_Thread(void * param)
{




unsigned int * done; .
Aud_Enc_Params_ptr aud_enc_param = (Aud_Enc_Params_ptr) param;
unsigned char local_encrypted_data[PACKET_SIZE];









Key_Gen___Encrypt_Decrypt() ; //iniate key for first level
encryption




























fwritef(const void *)local_encrypted_data, PACKET_SIZE, 1, file);
fwrite((const void *)global__fifo[index].sample bits, PACKET SIZE, 1,















unsigned int * done;
unsigned char local_to_decrypt[PACKET_SIZE];
// unsigned char local_done[PACKET_SIZE];
unsigned char local___to_be_decrypted[PACKET_SIZE] ;




















DspMsg (0,0,200,420,"reading start ");
while(! *done)
{
DspMsg (0,0,200,420,"reading start 1");
if(index == max_element_in_fifo)
index =0;






DspMsg [0,0,200,420,"reading start 3 ");
//recv socket directly into local_to_be_decrypted_data[index]
if(Aud_Strm_Net_Recv((unsigned char *) local_to_be__decrypted) )
{





//freadf(void *)local_to_be_decrypted,PACKET_SIZE, 1, file);
DspMsg (0,0,200,420,"reading start 4 ");









DspMsg (0,0,200,420,"reading start 5");
fwrite((void *)global_fifo[index].sample_bits, PACKET_SIZE, 1, filel);
++index;















static struct sockaddr_in sock_addr;// new_sock_addr;











iRet - WSAStartup(wVersionRequested, SwsaData);//request winsock version + service
if (iRet != 0)
{
MessageBox(NULL,"Failed Net Send WSAStartup", "Debug" , MB_OK);
return -1;
}
// Creating UDP Socket
if ((sendsock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) -= INVALID_SOCKET)
)


























sizeof (send__addr) )==SOCKET ERROR)
{
true_int = 1;


















void Aud_Strm_Net_Send(unsigned char * buffer)
<
int tot__sent = 0;
int ret = 0;
while(tot_sent!=PACKET_SIZE)
{
ret = send(sendsock, (const char *) sbufferftot sent], PACKET SIZE -
tot_sent, 0) ; ~~ -
if(ret==SOCKET_ERROR)
{
MessageBox(NULL,"Failed Net Send at send", "Debug" , MB OK);
break; ""
}












MessageBox(NULL, " case WSAEINTR", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEACCES:
MessageBox(NULL, " case WSAEACCES", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; ~~
case WSAEFAULT:
MessageBox(NULL, " case WSAEFAULT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEINVAL:
MessageBox(NULL, " case WSAEINVAL", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEMFILE:
MessageBox (NULL, " case WSAEMFILE", "NET_ERR", MB_OK) ;
break;
case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEWOULDBLOCK", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; ~~
case WSAEINPROGRESS:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAEINPROGRESS", "NET_ERR", MB_OK) ;
break; ~~
case WSAEALREADY:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEALREADY", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENOTSOCK:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENOTSOCK", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEDESTADDRREQ:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEDESTADDRREQ", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEMSGSIZE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEMSGSIZE", "NET_ERR", MBjOK);
break;
case WSAEPROTOTYPE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEPROTOTYPE", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENOPROTOOPT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENOPROTOOPT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; _
case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEOPNOTSUPP:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEOPNOTSUPP", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEPFNOSUPPORT:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAEPFNOSUPPORT", "NET_ERR", MB___OK) ;
break;
case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEAFNOSUPPORT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEADDRINUSE:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAEADDRINUSE", "NET_ERR", MB__OK) ;
break;
case WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENETDOWN:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENETDOWN", "NET_ERR", MBJOK) ;
break;
case WSAENETUNREACH:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENETUNREACH", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENETRESET:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENETRESET", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAECONNABORTED:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAECONNABORTED", "NET_ERR", MBjOK);
break;
case WSAECONNRESET:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAECONNRESET", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENOBUFS:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAENOBUFS", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEISCONN:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEISCONN", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAENOTCONN:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAENOTCONN", "NETJ5RR", MB__OK) ;
break;
case WSAESHUTDOWN:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAESHUTDOWN", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAETIMEDOUT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAETIMEDOUT", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAECONNREFUSED:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAECONNREFUSED", "NET_ERR", MB OK);
break; —
case WSAEHOSTDOWN:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAEHOSTDOWN", "NET__ERR", MB OK) ;
break; _
case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEHOSTUNREACH", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSAEPROCLIM:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEPROCLIM", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSASYSNOTREADY:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSASYSNOTREADY", "NET__ERR", MB_OK) ;
break;
case WSAVERNOTSUPPORTED:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAVERNOTSUPPORTED", "NET ERR", MB OK);
break;
case WSANOTINITIALISED:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSANOTINITIALISED", "NET_ERR", MBJDK);
break; ~
case WSAEDISCON:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAEDISCON", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSATYPE_NOT_F0UND:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSATYPE_NOT_F0UND", "NET_ERR", MBJDK);
break; ~
case WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAHOSTJN0T_FOUND", "NET_ERR", MBjDK);
break; ~"
case WSATRY_AGAIN:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSATRY_AGAIN", "NET__ERR", MB_OK) ;
break;
case WSAN0_RECOVERY:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSANO_RECOVERY", "NET_ERR", MBJOK);
break;
case WSANO_DATA:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSANO_DATA", "NET_ERR", MBJDK);
break;
case WSA_INVALID_HANDLE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSA_INVALID_HANDLE", "NET_ERR", MBJDK);
break; ~
case WSA__INVALID_J?ARAMETER:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSA_INVALID_PARAMETER", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; ~~
case WSA_IO_INC0MPLETE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSA_IO_INC0MPLETE", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; ~
case WSA_IO_PENDING:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSA_IO__PENDING", "NET_ERR", MB_OK) ;
break;
case WSA__NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSA_NOT_EN0UGH_MEMORY", "NETJERR", MB_OK);
break;
case WSA_OPERATION_ABORTED:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSA_OPERATION_ABORTED", "NET_ERR", MB_OK);
break; -
case WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE", "NET_ERR", MB__OK);
break; ~
case WSAINVALIDPROVIDER:
MessageBox (NULL, "WSAINVALIDPROVIDER", "NET__ERR", MB_OK) ;
break;
case WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT", "NET_ERR", MBJOK);
break; -
case WSASYSCALLFAILURE:
MessageBox(NULL, "WSASYSCALLFAILURE", "NET_ERR", MBJDK);
break;*/ -
default:





















iRet = WSAStartup(wVersionRequested, SwsaData);//request winsock version + service
if (iRet != 0)
{
MessageBox(NULL,"Failed Net Recv WSAStartup", "Debug" , MBJDK);
return -1; ~~
)
if ((recvsock = socket(AF_INET, SOCKJSTREAM, 0)) == INVALID SOCKET)
{
























MessageBox(NULL,"Failed Net Recv at listen", "Debug" , MBJDK);
return -1; ~~
}sessionsock = accept(recvsock, NULL, NULL);
if(sessionsock == INVALIDJ30CKET)
{












int AudJStrmJNetJRecv(unsigned char * buffer)
{
int tot_recv = 0;
int ret = 0;
while(tot_recv!=PACKET_SIZE)
{




MessageBox (NULL,"Failed Net Send at send", "Debug" , MBJDK)
break;
)
else tot__recv += ret;
}
return 0;
// Aud_Strearal.h : main header file for the AUD_STREAM1 application
//
#if !defined(AFX_AUD_STREAM1_H 567C9B98_D4FF_42C1_9509_B06A91B91DDC INCLUDED_
#define AFX_AUDJ3TREAM1_H__567C9B98_D4FF_4 2C1J9509_B06A91B91DDC INCLUDED_
#if _MSC_VER > 1000
#pragma once
#endif // JXTSCJVER > 1000
#ifndef AFXWIN_H
#error include 'stdafx.h' before including this file for PCH
#endif
#include "resource.h" // main symbols
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// CAudJStreamlApp:
// See AudjStreaml.cpp for the implementation of this class
//













// NOTE - the ClassWizard will add and remove member functions here.
// DO NOT EDIT what you see in these blocks of generated code !
//}}AFX_MSG
DECLARE MESSAGE MAP f)
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//{{AFX_INSERT_LOCATION}}
// Microsoft Visual C++ will insert additional declarations immediately before the
previous line.
#endif // !defined (AFX_AUD_STREAM1__H___567C9B98_D4FF 42C1 9509 B06A91B91DDC INCLUDED
// Aud_StreamlDlg.h : header file
#if !defined(AFX_AUD_STREAM1DLG_H 0873lE50_8968_4 6F6j3F87_BE79DA234B89 INCLUDED
#define AFX_ADDJ3TREAM1DLG_H 08731E50_8968_4 6F6_8F87_BE79DA234B89 INCLUDED_
#if _MSC_VER > 1000
#pragma once
#endif // _MSC_VER > 1000
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// CAudjStreamlDlg dialog




CAudjStreamlDlg(CWnd* pParent - NULL); // standard constructor
// Dialog Data
//{{AFX_DATA(CAudjStreamlDlg)
enum { IDD = IDD_AUD_STREAMl_DIALOG };
// NOTE: the ClassWizard will add data members here
//}}AFX_DATA
// ClassWizard generated virtual function overrides
//){AFX_VIRTUAL(CAudjStreamlDlg)
protected:





// Generated message map functions
//{|AFX_MSG(CAudJ5treamlDlg)
virtual BOOL OnlnitDialog();










// Microsoft Visual C++ will insert additional declarations immediately before the
previous line.





















void cdecl Aud_StrmJDSJDapture(void *);







#define AUD STREAM PLAY
void cdecl Audj3trm_DS_Play(void * params);
















#define INIT CONDITION 0.876786
void Aud_Strm_Bit_Swap_Encrypt_Init(void);
void Aud_StrnjBit_SwapJDecrypt_Init(void);
void KeyJ3en_EncryptJDecrypt (void) ;
void Audj5trm_Bitj3wap_Encryptj3ample(unsigned char * sample byte);
void Aud_Strm_Bit_SwapJDecrypt_Sample(unsigned char * sample~byte);
void AudJStrm_EncryptJ3ample(unsigned char *input_val, unsigned char *output_val)
void AudJ3trm_DecryptJ3ample(unsigned char *input_val, unsigned char *output~val)
void cdecl AudJ5trm_Encrypt_Fifo_Thread(void * param); ~~























/* currently system only validated on llKhz, 8bps, mono*/
#define NUM^PACKETS 25 // 25 notifications per second
#define PACKETJ3IZE 441 // 441 per Aud_enc_buff (and network packets)
// which equates to about l/25th of sec
// should match num of notifications above
/* with llKhz Sampling rate at 8 bits per sample in mono, we have HKilobytes per second,
11025/25= 441bytes */
#define WAVJFREQ 11025 //sampling frequency
#define WAV__BPS 8 //bits per sample
#define WAV_CHNL 1 111 = mono, 2 = stereo
#endif
APPENDIX E
The M-files attached run the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption-decryption





fid=fopen('C:\Miscj2\hello.wav', 'rr); %insert filename accordingly
sound_file=fread(fid) ;










%a = a + hex2dec(10);







ciphertext = cipher (plaintext, w, s_box, poly_mat, 1);
















a = a + 16;






function [s_box, inv_s_box, w, polyjnat, inv poly mat] = aes init
%AES_INIT Initialisation of AES-components.
%
% [S__BOX, INV_S__BOX, W, POLY_MAT, INV_POLY_MAT] = AES_INIT
% initializes AES-components to be used by subsequent functions.
% In the initialization step the S-boxes (S_BOX and INV_S_BOX) and the polynomial
% matrice (POLY_MAT and INV_POLY_MAT) are created and an example cipher key is expanded
% into the round key schedule (W).
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Clear the command window
clc
% Create the S-box and the inverse S-box
[sjoox, inv_s_box] = s_box_gen (1);
% Create the round constant array
rcon = rcon_gen (1);
^global key
key=randint(1,16,[0 255])
% Create the expanded key (schedule)
w = key_expansionfkey, s_box, rcon, 1);
% Create the polynomial transformation matrix and the inverse polynomial matrix
% to be used in MIXJDOLUMNS
[polyjnat, inv_polyjnat] = poly_mat_gen (1);
%affJtrans.m
function b_out = affjtrans (b_in)
%AFF_TRANS Apply an affine transformation over GF(2"8).
%
% BJDUT = AFFJTRANS (B_IN)
% applies an affine transformation to the input byte B_IN.
%
% The transformation consists of
% 1. a polynomial modulo multiplication
% by a predefined multiplication polynomial
% using a predefined modulo polynomial over GF(2A8) and
% 2. the addition (XOR) of a predefined addition polynomial
%
% B_IN has to be a byte (0 <= B_IN <= 255).
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Define the modulo polynomial
%to be used in the modulo operation in poly_mult
mod_pol = bin2dec ('100000001');
% Define the multiplication polynomial
% In the Rijndael AES Proposal
% they say they use the polynomial '11110001',
% which is wrong.
mult__pol = bin2dec ('00011111');
% Define the addition polynomial
add_pol - bin2dec ('01100011');
% Modular polynomial multiplication
% of the input byte and the fixed multiplication polynomial
temp = polyjnult (b_in, mult_pol, mod_pol);
% Add (XOR) the constant (addition polynomial)
b_out = bitxor (temp, add_pol) ,-
%cipher,m
function ciphertext = cipher (plaintext, w, sJdox, polyjnat, vargin)
%CIPHER Convert 16 bytes of plaintext to 16 bytes of ciphertext.
%
% CIPHERTEXT - CIPHER (PLAINTEXT, W, S_BOX, POLY_MAT)
% converts PLAINTEXT to CIPHERTEXT,
% using the expanded cipher key W,
% the byte substitution table S_BOX, and
% the transformation matrix POLY MAT.
%
% CIPHERTEXT - CIPHER (PLAINTEXT, W, S_BOX, POLY_MAT, 1)
% switches verbose mode on, which displays intermediate results.
%
% PLAINTEXT has to be a vector of 16 bytes (0 <= PLAINTEXT(i) <= 255).
% W has to be a [44 x 4]-matrix of bytes (0 <= W(i,j) <= 255).
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 4
% Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbosejnode = 1;
%If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end
%if the input vector is a cell array or does not have 16 elements
if iscell (plaintext) | prod (size (plaintext)) ~= 16
% Inform user and abort
error ('Plaintext has to be a vector (not a cell array) with 16 elements.')
end
%If any element of the input vector cannot be represented by 8 bits
if any (plaintext < 0 | plaintext > 255)
% Inform user and abort
error ('Elements of plaintext vector have to be bytes (0 <= plaintext(i) <= 255).
end
% If the expanded key array is a cell arrray or does not have the correct size
if iscell (w) | any (size (w) ~= [44, 4])
% Inform user and abort
error ('w has to be an array (not a cell array) with [44 x 4] elements.')
end
% If any element of the expanded key array can not be represented by 8 bits
if any (w < 0 | w > 255)
% Inform user and abort
error ('Elements of key array w have to be bytes (0 <= w(i,j) <= 255).')
end










% Copy the 16 elements of the input vector
% column-wise into the 4x4 state matrix
state = reshape (plaintext, 4, 4);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('Initial state : ', state)
end
% Copy the first 4 rows (4x4 elements) of the expanded key
% into the current round key.
% Transpose to make this column-wise
roundjcey = (w(l:4, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('Initial round key : ', roundj^ey)
end
%Add (xor) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add__round__key (state, round_key);
% Loop over 9 rounds
for i_round =1:9
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex (['State at start of round ', num2str(i_round),' : '], state)
end
% Substitute all 16 elements of the state matrix
% by shoving them through the S-box
state = subjoytes (state, s_box);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After sub_bytes : ', state)
end
% Cyclically shift the last three rows of the state matrix
state = shiftjrows (state) ;
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After shift_rows : ', state)
end
% Transform the columns of the state matrix via a four-term polynomial
state = mix_columns (state, polyjnat);
'% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After mix_columns : ', state)
end
% Extract the current round key (4x4 matrix) from the expanded key
roundJcey = (w((l:4) + 4*i__round, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbose mode
dispjiex ('Round key : ', round_key)
end
%Add (XOR) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add_round_key (state, round_key);
end
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('State at start of final round : ', state)
end
% Substitute all 16 elements of the state matrix
% by shoving them through the S-box
state = subjaytes (state, s_box);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After sub_bytes : ', state)
end
% Cyclically shift the last three rows of the state matrix
state = shift_rows (state);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After shift_rows : ', state)
end
% Extract the last round key (4x4 matrix) from the expanded key
round_key = (w(41:44, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('Round key : ', round_key)
end
%Add (xor) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add_round_key (state, roundjcey);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('Final state : ', state)
end
% reshape the 4x4 state matrix into a 16 element row vector
ciphertext = reshape (state, 1, 16);
%inv_cipher.m
function plaintext = inv_cipher (ciphertext, wl, inv_sj30x, inv_poly_mat, vargin)
%INVJCIPHER Convert 16 bytes of ciphertext to 16 bytes of plaintext.
%
% PLAINTEXT = INVJCIPHER (CIPHERTEXT, W, INVJ3JBOX, INV_POLY_MAT)
% converts CIPHERTEXT (back) to the plaintext PLAINTEXT,
% using the expanded cipher key W,
% the inverse byte substitution table INVJ3_B0X, and
% the inverse transformation matrix INV_POLYJ*IAT.
%
% PLAINTEXT = INVJDIPHER (CIPHERTEXT, W, INV_S_BOX, INV_POLY_MAT, 1)
% switches verbose mode on, that displays intermediate results.
% CIPHERTEXT has to be a vector of 16 bytes (0 <= CIPHERTEXT(i) <= 255).
% W has to be a [44 x 4]-matrix of bytes (0 <= W(i,j) <= 255).
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 4
%Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbose^mode = 1;
% If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end
% If the input vector is a cell array or does not have 16 elements
if iscell (ciphertext) | prod (size (ciphertext)) ~= 16
% Inform user and abort
error ('Ciphertext has to be a vector (not a cell array) with 16 elements.')
end
% If any element of the input vector cannot be represented by 8 bits
if any (ciphertext < 0 | ciphertext > 255)
% Inform user and abort
error ('Elements of ciphertext vector have to be bytes (0 <= ciphertext(i) <= 255).
end
% If the expanded key array is a cell arrray or does not have the correct size
if iscell (wl) | any (size (wl) ~= [44, 4])
% Inform user and abort
error ('w has to be an array (not a cell array) with [44 x 4] elements.')
end
% If any element of the expanded key array can not be represented by 8 bits
if any (wl < 0 | wl > 255)
% Inform user and abort
error ('Elements of key array wl have to be bytes (0 <= wl(i,j) <= 255).')
end














% Copy the 16 elements of the input vector column-wlise into the 4x4 state matrix
state = reshape (ciphertext, 4, 4);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('Initial state :
end
', state)
% Copy the last 4 rowls (4x4 elements) of the expanded key
% into the current round key.
% Transpose to make this column-wlise
roundJcey = (wl(41:44, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('Initial round key : ', round_key)
end
%Add (xor) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add_round_key (state, round_key);
% Loop over 9 rounds backwlards
for i_round = 9 : -1 : 1
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex (['State at start of round ', num2str(i_round),' : '], state)
end
% Cyclically shift the last three rowls of the state matrix
state = inv__shift_rows (state);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After inv_shift_rowls : ', state)
end
% Substitute all 16 elements of the state matrix
% by shoving them through the S-box
state = sub_bytes (state, inv_s_box);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('After inv_sub_bytes : ', state)
end
% Extract the current round key (4x4 matrix) from the expanded key
round_key = (wl((l:4) + 4*i_round, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('Round key : \ round_key)
end
% Add (XOR) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add_roundJkey (state, roundjcey);
%Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('After add_round_key : ', state)
end
% Transform the columns of the state matrix via a four-term polynomial.
% Use the same function (mix_colurans) as in cipher,
% but wlith the inverse polynomial matrix
state = mix_columns (state, inv_poly_mat);
end
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
disp_hex ('State at start of final round : ', state)
end
%Cyclically shift the last three rowls of the state matrix
state = inv_shift__rows (state);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After inv_shift_rows : ', state)
end
% Substitute all 16 elements of the state matrix
% by shoving them through the inverse S-box
state = sub bytes (state, inv_s_box);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('After inv_subjaytes : ', state)
end
%Extract the "first" (final) round key (4x4 matrix) from the expanded key
roundjcey = (wl(l:4, :))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbose_mode
dispjiex ('Round key : ', round__key)
end
% Add (xor) the current round key (matrix) to the state (matrix)
state = add_round_key (state, round_key);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('Final state : ', state)
end
% reshape the 4x4 state matrix into a 16 element row vector
plaintext = reshape (state, 1, 16);
%cycle.m
function matrix_out = cycle (matrix_in, direction)
%SHIFT_ROWS Cyclically shift the rows of the state matrix.
%
% MATRIXJDUT = CYCLE (MATRIX_IN, 'left')
% cyclically shifts the last three rows of the input matrix to the left.
% The first row is not shifted: [12 3 4]
% The second row is cyclically shifted once to the left: [2 3 4 1]
% The third row is cyclically shifted twice to the left: [3 4 12]
% The fourth row is cyclically shifted thrice to the left: [4 12 3]
% MATRIXJDUT = CYCLE (MATRIXJEN, 'right')
$ cyclically shifts the last three rows of the input matrix to the right.
% The first row is not shifted: [12 3 4]
% The second row is cyclically shifted once to the right: [4 12 3]
% The third row is cyclically shifted twice to the right: [3 4 12]
% The fourth row is cyclically shifted thrice to the right: [2 3 4 1]
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-breraen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If the matrix has to be shifted to the left,
if strcmp (direction, 'left')
i generate the column vector [0 5 10 15] '
col = (0 : 5 : 15) ';
% If the matrix has to be shifted to the right,
else
% generate the column vector [16 13 10 7] '
col = (16 : -3 : 7) ';
end
% Generate the row vector [0 4 8 12]
row = 0 : 4 : 12;
% Repeat the column to create the matrix [0000] (left shift)
% [5555]
% [10 10 10 10]
% [15 15 15 15]
cols = repmat (col, 1,
% Repeat the row to create the matrix [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
rows = repmat (row, 4, 1);
% Add both matrices,
% fold back into the 0 ... 15 domain,
% and add 1, because Matlab indices do start with 1
% I 1 5 9 13]
% [ 6 10 14 2]
% [11 15 3 7]
% [16 4 8 12]
ind_mat = mod (rows + cols, 16) + 1;
% Apply the just created index matrix to the input matrix.
% Elements of the index matrix are linear (column-wise) indices.
matrix out = matrix in (ind mat);
%find_inverse.m
function b_inv = find_inverse (b_in, mod_pol)
%FIND_INVERSE Find the multiplicative inverse in GF(2"8).
%
% B_INV = FIND_INVERSE (B_IN, MOD_POL)
% finds the multiplicative inverse of B_IN
% in the finite Galois field GF(2n8)
% with respect to the predefined (irreducible modulo polynomial.
%
% B_IN has to be a byte (0 <= B_IN <= 255).
%
% This implementation is extremely simple, uneconomic, and slow;
% but it works and clearly demonstrates the definition of the inverse.
% Smarter implementations e.g. use the "extended Euclidean algorithm".
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Loop over all possible "test" bytes.
% The inverse of zero is defined as zero
for i = 1 : 255
% "Test-wise" compute the polynomial multiplication
% of the input byte and the current "test byte"
prod = polyjnult (b_in, i, mod_pol);
% If the polynomial modulo multiplication leaves a remainder of "1"
% we have found the inverse
if prod == 1
% Declare (save and return) the current test byte as inverse,
b_inv = i;





function w = key_expansion (key, sjaox, rcon, vargin)
%KEY_EXPANSION Expand the 16-byte cipher key.
%
% W = KEY_EXPANSION (KEY, S_B0X, RCON)
i creates the 44x4-byte expanded key W,

%Repeat the row to create the matrix [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
* [0 4 8 12]
rows = repmat (row, 4, 1);
% Add both matrices,
% fold back into the 0 ... 15 domain,
% and add 1, because Matlab indices do start with 1
% [ 1 5 9 13]
% [ 6 10 14 2]
% [11 15 3 7]
% [16 4 8 12]
indjnat = mod (rows + cols, 16) + 1;
% Apply the just created index matrix to the input matrix.
% Elements of the index matrix are linear (column-wise) indices.
matrix_out = matrix in find mat);
%find_inverse.m
function b_inv = find_inverse (b__in, mod__pol)
%FIND_INVERSE Find the multiplicative inverse in GF(2A8).
%
% B_INV = FIND_INVERSE (B_IN, MOD_POL)
% finds the multiplicative inverse of B_IN
% in the finite Galois field GF(2A8)
% with respect to the predefined (irreducible modulo polynomial.
%
% B_IN has to be a byte (0 <= B_IN <= 255).
%
% This implementation is extremely simple, uneconomic, and slow;
% but it works and clearly demonstrates the definition of the inverse.
% Smarter implementations e.g. use the "extended Euclidean algorithm".
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Loop over all possible "test" bytes.
% The inverse of zero is defined as zero
for i = 1 : 255
% "Test-wise" compute the polynomial multiplication
% of the input byte and the current "test byte"
prod = polyjnult (b_in, i, mod_pol);
% If the polynomial modulo multiplication leaves a remainder of "1"
% we have found the inverse
if prod = 1
% Declare (save and return) the current test byte as inverse,
b_inv = i;





function w = key_expansion (key, sjaox, rcon, vargin)
%KEY_EXPANSION Expand the 16-byte cipher key.
%
% W = KEY_EXPANSION (KEY, S_BOX, RCON)
% creates the 44x4-byte expanded key W,
% Repeat the row to create the matrix [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
* [0 4 8 12]
% [0 4 8 12]
rows = repmat (row, 4, 1);
% Add both matrices,
% fold back into the 0 ... 15 domain,
% and add 1, because Matlab indices do start with 1
% [ 1 5 9 13]
% [ 6 10 14 2]
% [11 15 3 7]
% [16 4 8 12]
indjnat = mod (rows + cols, 16) + 1;
% Apply the just created index matrix to the input matrix.
%Elements of the index matrix are linear (column-wise) indices.
matrix_out = matrix in (ind mat);
%find inverse.m
function b_inv = find_inverse (b_in, raod_pol)
%FIND_INVERSE Find the multiplicative inverse in GF(2A8)
%
% B_INV = FIND^INVERSE (B_IN, M0D_POL)
% finds the multiplicative inverse of B_IN
% in the finite Galois field GF(2A8)
% with respect to the predefined (irreducible modulo polynomial.
%
% B_IN has to be a byte (0 <= B_IN <= 255).
% This implementation is extremely simple, uneconomic, and slow;
% but it works and clearly demonstrates the definition of the inverse.
% Smarter implementations e.g. use the "extended Euclidean algorithm".
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Loop over all possible "test" bytes.
% The inverse of zero is defined as zero
for i = 1 : 255
% "Test-wise" compute the polynomial multiplication
%of the input byte and the current "test byte"
prod = polyjnult (b_in, i, mod_pol);
% If the polynomial modulo multiplication leaves a remainder of "1"
% we have found the inverse
if prod == 1
% Declare (save and return) the current test byte as inverse,
b_inv = i;





function w = key_expansion (key, s_box, rcon, vargin)
%KEY_EXPANSION Expand the 16-byte cipher key.
%
% W = KEY_EXPANSION (KEY, S_BOX, RCON)
% creates the 44x4-byte expanded key w,
% using the initial 16-byte cipher KEY,
% the predefined byte substitution table S_BOX, and
% the round constant RCON to be added to every fourth 16-byte sub-key.
%
% W = KEY^EXPANSION (KEY, S_BOX, RCON, 1)
% switches verbose mode on, that displays intermediate results.
%
% KEY has to be a vector of 16 bytes (0 <= KEY(i) <= 255).
%
% KEY_EXPANSION has to be called prior to CIPHER and INVJCIPHER.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. j. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
%If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 3
% Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbosejnode = 1;
%If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end
%If the key vector is a cell array or does not have 16 elements
if iscell (key) | prod (size (key)) ~= 16
% Inform user and abort
error ('Key has to be a vector (not a cell array) with 16 elements.')
end
% If any element of the key vector cannot be represented by 8 bits
if any (key < 0 [ key > 255)
% Inform user and abort
error ('Elements of key vector have to be bytes (0 <= key(i) <= 255).')
end










% Copy the 16 elements of the key vector row-wise
% into the first four rows of the expanded key
w= (reshape (key, 4, 4))';
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('w(l:4, :) : ', w)
end
% Loop over the rest of the 44 rows of the expanded key
for i = 5 : 44
% Copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer
temp = w(i - 1, :);
% Every fourth row is treated differently:
if mod (i, 4) === 1
% Perform a cyclic (byte-wise) permutation to the buffer
temp = rot_word (temp);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex (['After rot_word : '], temp)
end
% Substitute all 4 elements of the buffer
I by shoving them through the S-box
temp = sub_bytes (temp, sjoox);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex (['After subjsytes : '], temp)
end
% Compute the current round constant
r = rcon ((i - 1) /4, :);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex (['rcon(', num2str(i,'%02d'), ', :) : '],
end
% Add (XOR) the current rount constant
% to every element of the buffer
temp = bitxor (temp, r);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex (['After rcon xor : '], temp)
end
end
% The new row of the expanded key
% is the sum (XOR) of the row four rows before
% and the buffer
w(i, :) = bitxor (w(i - 4, :), temp);
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode




function state_out = add_round_key (state_in, round_key)
%ADDJIGUND_KEY Add (XOR) the round key to the state.
%
% STATEJDUT = ADD_ROUND_KEY (STATE_IN, ROUNDJCEY)
% adds the current round key matrix ROUND_KEY
% to the current state matrix STATE_IN.
% Adding in GF(2'18) is performed via bitwise XOR.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-breraen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Add state (matrix) and round key (matrix) via bitwise XOR
state_out = bitxor (state__in, round key);
%mix_columns.m
function state_out = mix_columns (statejLn, poly_mat)
%MIX_COLUMNS Transform each column of the state matrix.
%
% STATEJDUT = MIX_COLUMNS (STATE_IN, POLY_MAT)
% operates on the state matrix STATE_IN column-by-column
% using POLYJ4AT as the transformation matrix.
% MIXJDOLUMNS can also directly compute
% the inverse column transformation INVJYIIXJDOLUMNS
% by utilizising the inverse transformation matrix INV_P0LYJ4AT.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Define the irreducible polynomial
% to be used in the modulo operation in polyjnult
modjpol - bin2dec ('100011011');
% Loop over all columns of the state matrix
for i_col_state =1:4
I Loop over all rows of the state matrix
for i_row_state =1:4
% Initialize the scalar product accumulator
temp__state = 0;
% For the (innner) matrix vector product we want to do
% a scalar product
% of the current row vector of polyjnat
i and the current column vector of the state matrix.
% Therefore we need a counter over
% all elements of the current row vector of polyjnat and
% all elements of the current column vector of the state matrix
for i_inner =1:4
% Multiply (GF{2A8) polynomial multiplication)
% the current element of the current row vector of polyjnat with
% the current element of the current column vector of the state matrix
tempjprod = polyjnult (..,
polyjnat(i_row_state, i_inner), ...
state_in(i__inner, ijcol_state) , ...
modjpol) ;
% Add (XOR) the recently calculated product
% to the scalar product accumulator
temp_state = bitxor (temp_state, tempjprod);
end
% Declare (save and return) the final scalar product accumulator
% as the current state matrix element




function state__out = shiftjrows (state__in)
%SHIFT_ROWS Cyclically shift the rows of the state matrix.
%
% STATEJDUT = SHIFTJROWS (STATE_IN)
% cyclically shifts the last three rows of the state matrix to the left,
% The first row is not shifted: [12 3 4]
% The second row is cyclically shifted once to the left: [2 3 4 1]
% The third row is cyclically shifted twice to the left: [3 4 12]
% The fourth row is cyclically shifted thrice to the left: [4 12 3]
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Call the function cycle to do the actual left shifting
state_out = cycle (state_in, 'left');
%inv_shit_rows.m
function state__out=inv_shift_rows (state_in)
%INV_SHIFT_ROWS Cyclically shift (back) the rows of the state matrix.
%
% STATEJDUT = INVJSHIFTJROWS (STATE_IN)
% cyclically shifts the last three rows fo the state matrix to the right.
% The first row is not shifted: [12 3 4]
% The second row is cyclically shifted once to the right: [4 12 3]
% The third row is cyclically shifted twice to the right: [3 4 12]
% The fourth row is cyclically shifted thrice to the right: [2 3 4 1]
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
%Call the function cycle to do the actual right shifting
statejmt = cycle (state_in, 'right');
%poly_mat_gen.m
function [polyjnat, invjpolyjnat] = polyjnatjgen (vargin)
%POLY_MAT Create polynomial coefficient matrices.
%
% [POLYJ4AT, INV_POLY_MAT] = P0LY_MATj3EN
% creates the polynomial coefficient matrices
% to be used by the function MIXJDOLUMNS.
%
% [P0LY_MAT, INV_POLY_MAT] = POLY_MAT_GEN (1)
% switches verbose mode on, that displays intermediate results.
%
% POLY_MATJ3EN has to be called prior to CIPHER and INVJCIPHER.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 0
% Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbosejnode = 1;
% If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end




disp (' * * ')





% Define the first row of the polynomial coefficient matrix
% to be used in MIXJCOLUMNS in hexadecimal representation.
%Small values are chosen for computational speed reasons
rowjiex = {'02' '03' '01' '01'};
% Convert the polynomial coefficients to decimal "numbers"
% row =[2311]
row = hex2dec (rowjiex)';
% Construct a matrix with identical rows
% rows =[2311]
% [2 3 1 1]
% [2 3 11]
% [2 3 11]
rows = repmat (row, 4, 1);
i Construct the polynomial matrix
% by cyclically permuting the rows to the right
% polyjnat =[2311]
% [12 3 1]
% [112 3]
% [3 112]
polyjnat = cycle (rows, 'right');
% Define the first row of the inverse polynomial coefficient matrix
% to be used in INV_MIX_COLUMNS in hexadecimal representation,
invjrowjiex = ('0e' 'Ob' 'Od' '09'];
% Convert the polynomial coefficients to decimal "numbers"
invjrow = hex2dec (inv_rowjiex) ';
% Construct a matrix with identical rows
invjrows = repmat (invjrow, 4, 1);
% Construct the polynomial matrix
invjpolyjnat = cycle {invjrows, 'right');
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex (' polyjnat : ', polyjnat)
dispjiex (' invjpolyjnat : ', invjpolyjnat)
end
%polyjnult.m
function ab = polyjnult (a, b, modjpol)
%POLY_MULT Polynomial modulo multiplication in GF(2n8)
%
% AB = POLY_MULT (A, B, MOD_POL)
% performs a polynomial multiplication of A and B
% in the finite Galois field GF(2A8),
% using MOD_POL as the irreducible modulo polynomial.
% A and B have to be bytes (0 <= A, B <= 255).
% MOD_POL is of degree 8.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. j. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Initialize the product term
% to be used on the right-hand side of the XOR-iteration
ab = 0;
% Loop over every bit of the first factor ("a")
%starting with the least significant bit.
% This loop multiplies "a" and "b" modulo 2
for ijbit =1:8
% If the current bit is set,
% the second factor ("b") has to be multiplied
% by the corresponding power of 2
if bitget (a, i_bit)
% The power-2-multiplication is carried out
% by the corresponding left shift of the second factor ("b"
b_shift = bitshift (b, ijait - 1);
% and the modulo 2 (XOR) "addition" of the shifted factor
ab = bitxor (ab, b_shift);
end
end
% Loop over the 8 most significant bits of the "ab"-product.
% This loop reduces the 16-bit-product back to the 8 bits
% of a GF(2A8) element by the use of
% the irreducible modulo polynomial of degree 8.
for i_bit = 16 : -1 : 9
% If the current bit is set,
% "ab" (or the reduced "ab" respectively) has to be "divided"
% by the modulo polynomial
if bitget (ab, ijait)
% The "division" is carried out
% by the corresponding left shift of the modulo polynomial,
modjpoljshift = bitshift (modjpol, i_bit - 9) ;
% and the "subtraction" of the shifted modulo polynomial.
% Since both "addition" and "subtraction" are
% operations modulo 2 in this context,
% both can be achieved via XOR




function rcon = rconjgen (vargin)
%RCON_GEN Create round constants.
%
% RCON = RCONJ3EN
% creates the round constants vector RCON
% to be used by the function KEY_EXPANSION.
%
% RCON = RCONJ3EN (1)
% switches verbose mode on, that displays intermediate results.
%
% RCONJ3EN has to be called prior to KEYJSXPANSION.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 0
% Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbosejnode = 1;
% If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end










% Define the irreducible polynomial
% to be used in the modulo operation in polyjnult
modjpol = bin2dec ('100011011');
% The (first byte of the) first round constant is a "1"
rcon(l) = 1;
% Loop over the rest of the elements of the round constant vector
for i = 2 : 10
% The next round constant is twice the previous one; modulo
rcon(i) = polyjnult (rcon(i-l), 2, modjpol);
end
% The other (LSB) three bytes of all round constants are zeros
rcon = [rcon(:), zeros(10, 3)];
% Display intermediate result if requested
if verbosejnode
dispjiex ('rcon : ', rcon)
end
%rot_word.m
function w_out = rotjtford (w_in)
%ROT_WORD Rotate the elements of a four element vector.
%
% WJDUT = ROT_WORD (W_IN)
% performs a cyclic shift of the elements
% of the four element vector W_IN.
% [al, a2, a3, a4] —> [a2, a3, a4, al]
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-breraen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Do the shift...
w out = w in([2 3 4 1]);
%sj30x_gen.m
function [sJdox, inv_sJbox] = sj^oxjjen (vargin)
%S_BOX_GEN Create S-box and inverse S-box.
%
% [S_BOX, INV_S_BOX] = S_BOX_GEN
% creates the S-box and the inverse S-box
% to be used by the function SUBJ3YTES.
% The S-box is created in two steps:
% 1. Take the multiplicative inverse of the finite field GF(2'
% 2. Apply an affine transformation.
%
% [S BOX, INV S BOX] = S BOX GEN (1)
% switches verbose mode on, that displays intermediate results.
%
% S_BOX_GEN has to be called prior to
% KEY_EXPANSION, CIPHER, and INV_CIPHER.
%
% In the AES Specification Standard the S-boxes are depicted
% as arrays. For the sake of indexing-simplicity they are internally
% stored as vectors in this implementation.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% If there is an optional "verbose mode" argument
if nargin > 0
% Switch the verbose mode flag on
verbosejnode = 1;
% If there is no optional "verbose mode" argument
else
% Switch the verbose mode flag off
verbosejnode = 0;
end





disp ('* S-BOX CREATION *')
disp ('* * ' )





% Define the irreducible polynomial
% to be used in the modulo operation in polyjnult,
% called by findjLnverse
modjpol = bin2dec ('100011011');
% The polynomial multiplicative inverse of zero is defined here as zero.
% Matlab vectors start with an index of "1"
inverse(1) = 0;
% Loop over all remaining byte values
for i = 1 : 255
% Compute the multiplicative inverse of the current byte value
% with respect to the specified modulo polynomial
inverse(i + 1) = find_inverse (i, modjsol);
end
% Loop over all byte values
for i = 1 : 256
% Apply the affine transformation
sj)ox(i) = affj:rans (inverse(i) );
end
% Create the inverse S-box by taking the values
% of the elements of the S-Box as indices:
invjsjDox = sJboxjLnversion (sJjox) ;
% Display intermediate result if reguested
if verbose mode
%Display the sjoox and the inverse s_box in 16x16 matrix format.
%Notice the transpose character for row-wise matrix representation
sjooxjnat = reshape (sJdox, 16, 16)';
dispjiex (' sj^ox : ', sjsoxjnat)
invj3jDox_mat = reshape (inv_sjDox, 16, 16)';
dispjiex (' inv_sJdox : ', inv_sjDoxjnat)
end
%sjDoxjlnversion.m
function inv_sjoox = sjDox_inversion (sjoox)
%SJ30X_INVERSION Invert S-box.
%
% [INV_S_BOX] = S_BOX_INVERSION (S_BOX)
% creates the inverse S-box
% from the previously created S-box.
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Loop over all byte values
for i = 1 : 256
%Create the inverse S-box by taking the values
% of the elements of the S-Box as indices:
% e.g.: sjx>x(00hex) = 63hex ==> inv_sjDox (63hex) = OOhex
% (except the fact, that Matlab vectors start at 1...)
inv_sjoox (sjdox (i) +1) = i - 1;
end
%subjDytes.m
function bytesjsut = subjjytes (bytes_in, sJdox)
%SUB_BYTES Nonlinear byte substitution using a substitution table.
%
% BYTESJDUT = SUB_BYTES (BYTES_IN, SJBOX)
% transforms the input array BYTES_IN
% into the output array BYTESJDUT
% using the substitution table SJ30X,
%
% BYTES_IN has to be an array of bytes (0 <= BYTES_IN(i) <= 255).
% Copyright 2001-2005, J. J. Buchholz, Hochschule Bremen, buchholz@hs-bremen.de
% Version 1.0 30.05.2001
% Thanks to Matlab's marvellous matrix manipulation mastery,
% the substitution of a whole array can be formulated
% in just one statement
bytesjDut = sJdox (bytes_in + 1);
